The Psychology of Inequality. Michael Locke McLendonЧитать онлайн книгу.

      Introduction

      Most people, I suspect, would be embarrassed to defend much of Rousseau’s political thought outside an academic setting. In the twentieth century, Rousseau earned a reputation as both a proto-totalitarian and an oversensitive kook. Important World War II–era scholars held him responsible for the most dangerous movements in modern Europe, such as the Jacobin terrors of the French Revolution and the totalitarianism of Nazi fascism.¹ Bertrand Russell remarkably claimed, “Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau.”² Alternatively, in some quarters, he is viewed as a flaky romantic utopist tortured by his imagination and penchant for reverie. According to these critics, he lacks the temperament to honestly and rationally evaluate modern life.³ His emotions overwhelm his reason and lead him down an indulgent path of sentimentality and self-flagellation. This harsh reception of Rousseau in modern society, however unfair, should not be too surprising. Rousseau is perhaps the greatest critic of liberal democracy, and societies tend to scorn the ideas of their ideological enemies.

      There are, however, ways to make Rousseau more respectable to our commercial and democratic age. He is much more practical and realistic than is often recognized and occasionally adopts positions that are common in the liberal tradition. For example, in book I, chapter 9, of The Social Contract, he defends the right to private property in terms similar to John Locke and Samuel Pufendorf. In book III, his discussion of regime design resembles Montesquieu’s in Spirit of the Laws. In addition, scholars have frequently linked Rousseau to Immanuel Kant ever since Ernst Cassirer argued that Rousseau’s concept of moral freedom is a precursor to Kant’s moral theory.⁴ Although Kant was sometimes a critic and “never a slavish follower of Rousseau,” Kant’s intellectual and personal development was profoundly influenced by him.⁵ He too was principally dedicated to the freedom and dignity of the common person.⁶

      At the same time, there is a danger to emphasizing Rousseau’s similarities with liberal greats such as Locke, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, and Kant. By interpreting Rousseau as a modern liberal, or primarily so, he becomes far less interesting. His value to contemporary readers lies in his critique of modern society—in his ability to offend our sensibilities. To learn from him, we must be willing to entertain his claims that on the surface are too embarrassing to recite in public and are responsible for his reputation as a Nazi and a dreamer but nonetheless provide valuable insight into the nature and pathologies of contemporary life.

      This book draws upon the embarrassing Rousseau. It examines his concept of amour-propre, which literally translates as self-love, and uses it as a means to understand and evaluate modern-day commercial democracies. Specifically, it attempts to identify the contours and texture of the modern personality as well as explain why Rousseau thinks inequality is so dangerous.

      Amour-Propre Versus Rationality

      At first glance, this is a strange goal for a book written in the twenty-first century. Amour-propre in many respects is a classical aristocratic passion. It describes humans as honor loving, glory seeking, and obsessed with superiority. Not surprisingly, in aristocratic Europe—that is, for much of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries—numerous political theorists believed amour-propre to be the defining feature of human nature. As Arthur Lovejoy has convincingly demonstrated, this is true for many modern thinkers from Michel de Montaigne through Kant.⁷

      As the feudal institutions died off and were replaced by liberal ones such as a commercial economy and an egalitarian democracy, however, human behavior began to change. The new order made new demands of its inhabitants. People were no longer warriors and stewards of a nation or serfs trapped in lowly social positions. They were all economic competitors fighting for wealth. More than ever before, they had the opportunity to control their fates and make their own fortunes. They had to rely on their own wits and good sense to make their way in the world. Political and social theorists, consequently, began to reconceptualize humans as strategic and calculating—as rational beings chiefly concerned with their self-interest. Although early modern natural law theorists such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke portray humans as preoccupied with satisfying their desires