Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War. Elizabeth SchmidtЧитать онлайн книгу.
influenced the trajectory of the war on terror. Chapter 3 introduces the key international actors that intervened in Africa after the Cold War and explores their motivations and rationales for intervention.
At the heart of the book, chapters 4–11 present a series of subregional case studies, illustrating the two paradigms that were used to justify foreign intervention. Some cases exemplify foreign intervention as a response to instability and its corollary, responsibility to protect. Others typify external action as a component of the war on terror, a justification that was especially prevalent after the September 2001 attacks on the United States. Some cases are characterized by a single paradigm, while others bridge the two. Together the case studies offer evidence that supports the book’s four central propositions. Although the political, economic, and social components of each conflict are described, the case studies emphasize the impact of foreign intervention rather than the internal dynamics of the struggles. They offer overviews of each conflict and do not attempt to evaluate the relative importance of internal and external factors. For readers interested in other aspects of the conflicts, Suggested Reading sections are appended to each chapter.
Chapters 12 and 13 look more closely at the role of the United States. Chapter 12 investigates US involvement in Africa after the Cold War, from the Clinton through Obama administrations. Concerns about political and economic instability and international terrorism shaped US policies and had a significant impact on outcomes in Africa. Chapter 13 offers a window on US Africa policy during the first year of the Trump administration, exploring continuities and discontinuities with previous administrations. The Conclusion summarizes the pitfalls of foreign political and military intervention in Africa during the first quarter century after the Cold War and suggests some requirements for the establishment of lasting peace.
The sections below briefly summarize the case studies featured in chapters 4–11, grouped by subregion, and the elements of US Africa policy discussed in chapters 12–13, noting how they illustrate the paradigms used to justify foreign intervention after the Cold War.
East Africa: Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan
Chapter 4 focuses on foreign intervention in Somalia from 1991 through 2017. After the central state collapsed in 1991, warlords and Islamists vied for control. The UN, the United States, the AU, and neighboring countries interceded, initially motivated by the response to instability and the responsibility to protect, but increasingly galvanized by the war on terror as a jihadist insurgency emerged in response to outside intervention. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable to Somalia for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant to the period before September 2001, but it took on greater urgency in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
Chapter 5 examines foreign intervention in Sudan (1991–2017) and South Sudan (2011–17). In Sudan, civil war, local insurgencies, ethnic cleansing, and terrorist networks generated enormous instability inside the country and across its borders. Neighboring states supported rival factions in the north-south civil war (1983–2005), while the UN, the United States, European countries, and African subregional organizations mediated problematic peace accords that ended the war but laid the groundwork for future conflicts. The AU and the UN staged inventions to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of western Sudan from 2003, but they failed to sustain the operations until peace was restored. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable to Sudan for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant to much of the 1990s; however, by the end of the decade Khartoum had begun to collaborate in the US-led war on terror in the hope that its cooperation would lead to the lifting of sanctions.
Central Africa: Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
Chapter 6 investigates foreign involvement in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide, and chapter 7 examines foreign intervention in neighboring Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo from 1994 to 2017.19 In both cases, France exercised its presumed right as the world’s dominant francophone power, intervening unilaterally or pushing the UN Security Council to act. Neighboring states also promoted their own interests, sometimes backing existing governments and at other times supporting rebel movements. UN peacekeeping missions, weakened by conflicts inside the Security Council, were ineffectual and marred by controversy. In Rwanda, France sustained the genocidal regime, while Uganda supported the rebel movement that ousted it. As the genocide unfolded, powerful members of the Security Council terminated a peacekeeping operation and refused to authorize an intervention to halt the killing. When Rwandan refugees streamed into Zaire, that country became a new battleground. Regional powers took sides, with some supporting the ruling regime and others backing rebel proxies. All parties fought over Zaire’s riches, while the UN made futile efforts to reestablish peace. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm applies to both Rwanda and the DRC during the period under consideration. The war on terror did not play a role in international response to the crisis in either country.
West Africa, Part 1: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire
Chapter 8 explores foreign intervention in the West African countries of Liberia (1990–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002), while chapter 9 considers external involvement in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–11). In each case, war and plunder took an enormous toll after the Cold War. A West African subregional body interceded in all three conflicts, purportedly to reestablish peace and security, but sometimes to further member states’ political and economic interests. Liberia promoted a proxy war in Sierra Leone, and this in turn stimulated intervention by the UN, foreign mercenaries, and the UK, which asserted its prerogative as the former colonial power. France claimed a similar prerogative in Côte d’Ivoire. Neighboring states meanwhile pursued their own interests, either through the subregional body or unilaterally. The AU provided mediators, and the UN sent a peacekeeping mission. In all three cases, the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm was paramount; the war on terror was not a factor.
North Africa: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
Chapter 10 considers the role of foreign intervention in North Africa from 2011 to 2017. This period encompasses the Arab Spring (2011–13), a series of popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian regimes and transformed the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East. It also considers the uprisings’ aftermath (2013–17), when old regime remnants and other armed groups vied with prodemocracy forces for control. The chapter gives special consideration to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—the three African countries involved in the movement for social and political change. France, the United States, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were the most consequential foreign actors. They intervened first in response to instability and, in the case of Libya, to protect civilian lives. In Libya, regime change was also the goal of several external powers. After the old regimes fell and international terrorist networks joined the fight, the war on terror paradigm was used to justify further foreign involvement.
West Africa, Part 2: Mali, Nigeria, and the Western Sahel
Chapter 11 examines foreign intervention in the Western Sahel states of Mali and Nigeria