Restless Nation. William GumedeЧитать онлайн книгу.

      To the memory of Patrick van Sleight (1971-2008). Hamba kahle. And to the unsung heroes of the 1985 youth generation: building the inclusive, democratic and caring South African society we dreamed of then, is so much more exasperating, painful and complex than we could have ever imagined. Yet, we cannot give up on that dream.

      Author’s note

      These are selected columns, blogs and written and radio opinion pieces. They appeared or were aired after 2005. A full collection, including my substantial work before that, would span many books. The commentary included in this collection tries to make sense of these increasingly uncertain, complex and dangerous times, and the astonishingly self-interested and empty leadership at the head of our society. Our leadership seems bereft of any fresh ideas, or, if not that, are either appallingly complacent or simply lacking the will to steer SA Inc to surer ground.

      Sadly, in the rest of Africa and worldwide, for that matter, there appears to be the same leadership vacuum. Some of these pieces were edited and shortened for length. In some cases, the original version of the commentary was used when it was substantially reduced in the published version. These commentaries have all appeared in media with very specific audiences – and sometimes quite specialist – and have not always been generally available, at home or abroad. The intention of this publication is to bring this commentary to a much wider audience.

      William Gumede

      Johannesburg

      The

       leadership

       paralysis

       in the ANC

      The limits of a liberation legacy

      The inability to transform from resistance movements into effective governing parties lies at the heart of the governmental failures of many African independence and liberation movements. Such movements, of which the African National Congress (ANC) is a case in point, come to power with an extraordinary amount of legitimacy, given their history of opposing colonial governments or white minority regimes.

      This ‘struggle legitimacy’ gives them a much stronger political, economic and moral mandate than that of governments in most other developing countries (except some in East Asia that have also emerged from colonial domination). Their social capital gives them the ability to mobilise societies behind their programmes for long periods, without serious challenges to their legitimacy. But, if such power goes unchecked, it also means that they can get away with service delivery failure, autocratic behaviour and wrongdoing in the name of advancing the liberation or independence project.

      Members, supporters and voters are extraordinarily lenient to these movements and they, in turn, have extraordinary power to bestow legitimacy on individuals, institutions and behaviour. Conversely, their struggle credentials also allow them to delegitimise individuals, institutions or behaviour, of which they disapprove. In power, they have an additional legitimising tool: the new state and its apparatus. Combined, if used for the widest possible national, public good and democratic interest, this legitimacy should arguably be a powerful tool for African independence and liberation movements turned government to transform their societies for the better. Yet, most such movements have, once in power, squandered this opportunity.

      Because they have such hegemony, the political culture that is manifested within these movements is also replicated within the new state. In their attempts to transform their societies, leaders of these movements fuse their parties with the new state to form a kind of ‘party state’, with the movement and the party becoming almost indistinguishable. There is no firewall between the party itself and the executive, legislatures and public institutions. In fact, independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party, and not only are the heads of such institutions ‘deployed’ by the party leadership, they are also expected to defer to it.

      The difficulty for many African countries is how to reverse the negative impact on the state if the political culture of the dominant movement turns undemocratic, autocratic or authoritarian. Given the nature of the independence and liberation struggles, these movements are organised in a top-down, secretive and military-like fashion, with power in the hands of a small leadership group. When the leadership decides, the members are expected to obey according to the principle of democratic centralism.

      Most independence and liberation movements which are still in power see their movements as the embodiment of the ‘people’ and therefore see themselves as able to speak for the whole nation, with the leader as the tribune of the ‘people’. Typically, during their liberation struggles, nations were divided between those on the side of the liberation movement and those that were aligned with the colonial or minority government or their allies. In power, many independence and liberation movements still divide the world between those on their side and those belonging to the old order. Opposition or criticism, whether from within or from outside the movement, is therefore often wrongly construed as ‘opposition’ to the demands of the ‘people’. The result of such reasoning has been that independence and liberation movements rarely feel obliged to own up to their failures or examine themselves.

      The ANC seems to have fallen into this trap as well. Former ANC secretary-general, and now deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe’s famous report on the state of the movement’s internal organisation and values has spoken volumes about such behaviour. To realign itself with its original mission, the challenge for the ANC would be to face up to Motlanthe’s call to transform itself from the inside out. Its members, supporters and activists should play a more active role in keeping the ANC democratic and holding its leadership accountable.

      In South Africa, we are fortunate that a range of other progressive groups also have ‘struggle’ legitimacy. Some of these movements are outside the ANC family: the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). These movements have, of course, now lost most of their struggle legitimacy as leadership squabbles and weak policies, combined with the ANC’s dominance, have contributed to their demise, but importantly, ANC allies, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), have struggle legitimacy in their own right, even though they are in alliance with the ANC.

      Moreover, progressive civil society organisations, of which many participated or had their genesis in the United Democratic Front (UDF), can also claim legitimacy from the same source. It is their responsibility to stop the ANC from backsliding into undemocratic behaviour by being assertive civic watchdogs. This role should not be seen as inimical to their alliance with the ANC. Pro-democracy activists from the ANC, together with progressive civil society groups, unions and SACP members could, for example, form a pro-democracy lobby within the ANC that could push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all organisational levels.

      But society must also be less tolerant of non-delivery, mismanagement and leaders’ autocratic behaviour. The current wave of protest against public representatives should be viewed positively, provided that it stays within the restrictions of the law. It is a form of public criticism which helps to hold the ANC leadership accountable when democratic institutions do not. COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi summed it up when he said: ‘The election of a progressive leadership [does not] mean the end of the struggle and that we must now step back and hand over everything to these progressive, trusted leaders as though they are messiahs and will deliver everything on a silver platter, while we are in our beds sleeping.’

      Individual leaders of the ANC deployed by the party leadership to head independent oversight institutions, such as the Chapter 9 institutions, must become more independent, and serve the public interest and not the interests of the ANC leadership, which do not always coincide. In summary, if a critical mass of individuals, institutions and communities with struggle credentials from within the ANC family are assertive in their dissent when the ANC acts against the public interest, the organisation’s leadership is likely to become more accountable and responsive to criticism. At the same time, consistent dismissal of such criticism on the grounds that it is counter-revolutionary