Jonathan Edwards
The Freedom of the Will
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2018 OK Publishing
ISBN 978-80-272-4754-7
Table of Contents
Preface
Part I.
Section 1. Concerning The Nature Of The Will.
Section 2. Concerning The Determination Of The Will.
Section 3. Concerning The Meaning Of The Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &C; And Of Contingence.
Section 4. Of The Distinction Of Natural And Moral Necessity, And Inability.
Section 5. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty, And Of Moral Agency.
Part II.
Section I. Showing The Manifest Inconsistence Of The Arminian Notion Of Liberty Of Will, Consisting In The Will's Self-Determining Power.
Section 2. Several Supposed Ways Of Evading The Forgoing Reasoning, Considered.
Section 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, And Volition In Particular, Can Come To Pass Without A Cause Of Its Existence.
Section 4. Whether Volition Can Arise Without A Cause, Through The Activity Of The Nature Of The Soul.
Section 5. Showing, That If The Things Asserted In These Evasions Should Be Supposed To Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, And Can't Help The Cause Of Arminian Liberty.
Section 6. Concerning The Will's Determining In Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent, In The View Of The Mind.
Section 7. Concerning The Notion Of Liberty Of Will Consisting In Indifference.
Section 8. Concerning The Supposed Liberty Of The Will, As Opposite To All Necessity.
Section 9. Of The Connection Of The Acts Of The Will With The Dictates Of The Understanding.
Section 10. Volition Necessarily Connected With The Influence Of Motives.
Section 11. The Evidence Of God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Volitions Of Moral Agents.
Section 12. God's Certain Foreknowledge Of The Future Volitions Of Moral Agents, Inconsistent With Such A Contingence Of Those Volitions, As Is Without All Necessity.
Section 13. Whether We Suppose The Volitions Of Moral Agents To Be Connected With Any Thing Antecedent, Or Not, Yet They Must Be Necessary In Such A Sense As To Overthrow Arminian Liberty.
Part III.
Section 1. God's Moral Excellency Necessary, Yet Virtuous And Praise-Worthy.
Section 2. The Acts Of The Will Of The Human Soul Of Jesus Christ Necessarily Holy, Yet Truly Virtuous, Praise-Worthy, Rewardable, &C.
Section 3. The Case Of Such As Are Given Up Of God To Sin, And Of Fallen Man In General, Proves Moral Necessity And Inability To Be Consistent With Blame-Worthiness.
Section 4. Command, And Obligation To Obedience, Consistent With Moral Inability To Obey.
Section 5. That Sincerity Of Desires And Endeavours, Which Is Supposed To Excuse In The Non-Performance Of Things In Themselves Good, Particularly Considered.
Section 6. Liberty Of Indifference, Not Only Not Necessary To Virtue, But Utterly Inconsistent With It; And All, Either Virtuous Or Vicious Habits Or Inclinations.
Section 7. Arminian Notions Of Moral Agency Inconsistent With All Influence Of Motive And Inducement, In Either Virtuous Or Vicious Actions.
Part IV.
Section 1. The Essence Of The Virtue And Vice Of Dispositions Of The Heart, And Acts Of The Will, Lies Not In Their Cause, But Their Nature.
Section 2. The Falseness And Inconsistence Of That Metaphysical Notion Of Action, And Agency, Which Seems To Be Generally Entertained By The Defenders Of The Arminian Doctrine Concerning Liberty, Moral Agency, &C.
Section 3. The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy Of Either Praise Or Blame.
Section 4. It Is Agreeable To Common Sense, And The Natural Notions Of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment.
Section 5. Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means And Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness.
Section 6. Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been
