A new look at the Russian February Revolution of 1917. Борис РомановЧитать онлайн книгу.
burden on the human resources of the countries participating in the First World War, he cited such figures [Volkov, S.V. "The Forgotten War", 2004.]:
<<The share of the mobilized in Russia was the smallest, only 39% of all men aged 15-49, while in Germany 81%, Austria-Hungary 74%, France 79%, England 50% Italy – 72%. At the same time, for every thousand people mobilized in Russia, there were killed and dead 115, while Germany – 154, Austria – 122, France – 168, England – 125, etc.), for every thousand men aged 15-49 years Russia lost 45 men, Germany – 125, Austria – 90, France – 133, England – 62; Finally, for every thousand people at all, Russia lost 11 people, Germany – 31, Austria – 18, France – 34, England – 16. Let's add that almost the only of the fought countries, Russia did not have any problems with food. The inconceivable structure of "military bread" of the model of 1917 in Germany could not dreame to anyone in Russia. >>
Thus, the hardships of the war in Russia were much less severe than in Austria-Hungary and Germany or France, and no more severe than in England. Nevertheless, unlike these countries, in Russia, almost from the very beginning of the war, a conspiracy against the supreme authority (against Nicholas II) was brewing, and by the beginning of 1917 this plot had found a real plan.
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Ten years after the catastrophe of 1917, Winston Churchill wrote about Russia and Nicholas II: [Winston Churchill. The World Crisis 1916-1918. Vol.1 N.Y. 1927. (P.227-228)]
“It is the shallow fashion of these times to dismiss the Tsarist regime as a purblind, corrupt, incompetent tyranny. But a survey of its thirty months' war with Germany and Austria should correct these loose impressions and expose the dominant facts. We may measure the strength of the Russian Empire by the battering it had endured, by the disasters it had survived, by the inexhaustible forces it had developed, and by the recovery it had made. In the governments of states, when great events are afoot, the leader of the nation, whoever he be, is held accountable for failure and vindicated by success. No matter who wrought the toil, who planned the struggle, to the supreme responsible authority belongs the blame or credit.
Why should this stern test be denied to Nicholas II? He had made many mistakes, what ruler has not? He was neither a great captain nor a great prince. He was only a true, simple man of average ability, of merciful disposition, upheld in all his daily life by his faith in God. But the brunt of supreme decisions centred upon him. At the summit where all problems are reduced to Yea or Nay, where events transcend the faculties of man and where all is inscrutable, he had to give the answers. His was the function of the compass needle. War or no war? Advance or retreat? Right or left? Democratise or hold firm? Quit or persevere? These were the battlefields of Nicholas II. Why should he reap no honour from them? The devoted onset of the Russian armies which saved Paris in 1914; the mastered agony of the munitionless retreat; the slowly regathered forces; the victories of Brusilov; the Russian entry upon the campaign of 1917, unconquered, stronger than ever; has he no share in these? In spite of errors vast and terrible, the regime he personified, over which he presided, to which his personal character gave the vital spark, had at this moment won the war for Russia.
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