An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John LockeЧитать онлайн книгу.
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§ 70. […] But whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their power, may put Men out of their way to [272]Happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so different courses of life, this yet is certain, that Morality, established upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one, that will but consider: and he that will not be so far a rational Creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has established, as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew, when the eternal State is considered but in its bare possibility, which no Body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good Life here, and the contrary state the possible Reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude, That a vertuous Life, with the certain expectation of everlasting Bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of Misery, which ’tis very possible may overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of Annihilation. […]
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Of Mixed Modes
§ 1. […] the Complex Ideas, we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenness, a Lye, etc. which consisting of several Combinations of simple Ideas of different kinds, I have called Mixed Modes, to distinguish them from the more simple Modes, which consist only of simple Ideas of the same kind. These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex Ideas of Substances.
§ 2. […] The Mind […] being once furnished with simple Ideas, it can put them together in several Compositions, and so make variety of complex Ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these Ideas are called Notions: as if they had their Original, and constant Existence, more in the Thoughts of Men, than in the reality of things; and to form such Ideas, it sufficed, that the Mind put the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering whether they had any real Being: though I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from Observation, […]. For the Man who first framed the Idea of Hypocrisy, might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who made shew of good Qualities which he had not; or else have framed that Idea in his Mind, without having any such pattern to fashion it by. […]
[276]§ 3. […] an usual way of getting these complex Ideas, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For consisting of a company of simple Ideas combined, they may by words, standing for those simple Ideas, be represented to the Mind of one who understands those words, though that complex Combination of simple Ideas were never offered to his Mind by the real existence of things. Thus a Man may come to have the Idea of Sacrilege, or Murther, by enumerating to him the simple Ideas which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.
§ 4. Every mixed Mode consisting of many distinct simple Ideas, it seems reasonable to enquire, whence it has its Unity; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one Idea, since that Combination does not always exist together in Nature. To which I answer it is plain, it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining those several simple Ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this Union, or that which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to that Combination. […] Thus, though the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into one complex Idea, as the killing a Man’s Father; yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of Parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex Idea, nor a distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or any other Man.
[278]§ 5. If we should enquire a little farther, to see what it is, that occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple Ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled Modes, and neglect others […], we shall find the reason of it to be the end of Language; which being to mark, or communicate Men’s Thoughts to one another, with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make such Collections of Ideas into complex Modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of Living and Conversation, […].
§ 6. This shews us how it comes to pass that there are in every Language many particular words, which cannot be rendred by any one single word of another. For the several Fashions, Customs, and Manners of one Nation, making several Combinations of Ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have had never any occasion to make, or, perhaps, so much as take notice of […].
§ 7. Hence also we may see the Reason, Why Languages constantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms. Because change of Customs and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of Ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them; and so they become new Species of complex Modes. […]
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§ 9. There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex Ideas of mixed Modes. 1. By Experience and Observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the Idea of wrestling or fencing. 2. By Invention, [280]or voluntary putting together of several simple Ideas in our own Minds: So he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an Idea of it in his Mind, before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our Imaginations all those Ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. […]
§ 10. It is worth our observing which of all our simple Ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed Modes made out of them, with names given to them: And those have been these three; Thinking, and Motion, (which are the two Ideas which comprehend in them all Action,) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceived to flow. […]
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Of our Complex Ideas of Substances
§ 1. THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as they are found in exteriour things, or by Reflection on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple Idea, [282]which indeed is a complication of many Ideas together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call Substance.
§ 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the Indian […]; who, saying that the World was supported