An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John LockeЧитать онлайн книгу.
not applied their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal Consent, such an one I easily allow: But such an universal Consent [84]as this, proves not the Idea of God, no more than it does the Idea of such Angles, innate.
§ 17. Since then though the knowledge of a GOD, be the most natural discovery of humane Reason, yet the Idea of him, is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other Idea found, that can pretend to it. […] I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.
§ 18. I confess, there is another Idea, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the Idea of Substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by Sensation or Reflection. If Nature took care to provide us any Ideas, we might well expect it should be such, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our selves: But we see on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby other Ideas are brought into our Minds, this is not, We have no such clear Idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word Substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (i. e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) Idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those Ideas we do know.
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§ 20. […] If there be any innate Ideas, any Ideas, in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on; they must be lodg’d in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by Remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are [86]remembred, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever Idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembred: This consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes Remembring from all other ways of Thinking. […] whatever Idea being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory, which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembred. […] By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate Ideas in the mind before impression from Sensation or Reflection. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time remembred any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are Ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.
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§ 22. To conclude, some Ideas forwardly offer themselves to all Men’s Understandings; and some sorts of Truths result from any Ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into Propositions: Other Truths require a train of Ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered, and assented to. Some of the [88]first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: But the truth is, Ideas and Notions are no more born with us, than Arts and Sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our Faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received. […]
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§ 24. When Men have found some general Propositions that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopp’d the enquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once styled innate: And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be Masters and Teachers, to make this the Principle of Principles, That principles must not be questioned: For having once established this Tenet, That there are innate Principles, it put their Followers upon a necessity of receiving some Doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of Men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dictator of Principles, and Teacher of unquestionable Truths; and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle, which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby Men came to [90]the knowledge of many universal Truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of Men, from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those Faculties, that were fitted by Nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employ’d about them.
§ 25. To shew how the Understanding proceeds herein, is the design of the following Discourse […]. Wherein I warn the Reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allow’d the Privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my Principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the Principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to Mens own unprejudiced Experience, and Observation, whether they be true, or no. […]
[92]Book II
CHAPTER I
Of Ideas in general, and their Original
§ 1. EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ’d about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, that are there, ’tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds several Ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have native Ideas, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examined already: and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the Understanding may get all the Ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every one’s own Observation and Experience.
§ 2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ’d either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal [94]Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
§ 3. First, Our Senses, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct Perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those Ideas, we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external Objects convey into the mind what produces there those Perceptions. This great Source, of most of the Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call SENSATION.
§ 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas, is the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds within us, as it is employ’d about the Ideas it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of Ideas, which could not be had from things without: and such are, Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious