The Activist's Handbook. Randy ShawЧитать онлайн книгу.
politicians help bring social change, far too many suppress activists’ agendas as effectively as clearly labeled enemies do. This occurs because progressive constituencies feel loyalty toward the politicians they help elect. This loyalty leads progressives to avoid holding politician “allies” accountable for their campaign commitments and to refrain from criticizing them for acts they would strongly oppose if undertaken by conservatives. Concerns over maintaining access, appearing “reasonable,” and fulfilling the personal ambitions of organizational leaders contribute to this pattern of nonaccountability. Progressive constituencies’ failure to demand accountability of the Officials their votes and volunteer labor put into office is a major obstacle to achieving social change. In fact, it might be the biggest obstacle, since it means that progressives do not produce the sweeping results from election victories that conservatives secure from their wins. Activists must understand that people feel betrayed when politicians fail to deliver on their campaign promises to support progressive change, and they respond with cynicism to subsequent social change efforts. Some join the ranks of nonvoters, impairing the election prospects of authentic progressive candidates. Without political accountability, working to elect candidates to office becomes a fool’s errand.
It seems obvious that activists would focus on results rather than promises when it comes to elected Officials. After all, this is how we evaluate performance in our workplaces, investments, and consumer choices. But in my experience, activists often view elected Officials as allies without their having done anything to earn the moniker. Politicians need only agree to take certain positions in the future to earn the support of many progressive organizations. This makes strategic sense for politicians but not for advocates of social change. Given the ease with which they can achieve progressive credentials, politicians have no incentive to actually do anything to serve progressive constituencies. As a result, few Officials feel it politically necessary to wage a major fight against the status quo on behalf of progressive reform. As a former leader of San Antonio’s COPS (Communities Organized for Public Services) puts it, “When politicians deliver, we applaud them. Not until then. . . . Politicians’ work is to do your work. When you’ve got somebody working for you, you don’t bow and scrape.”2
Adopting a “fear and loathing” approach toward elected Officials, particularly self-identified progressives, is essential for achieving social change. Activists must focus on results, not promises; they must pursue their agenda, not the politician’s. The Obama administration’s first term showed that many activists allow great speeches to substitute for concrete actions; only the latter bring progressive change. Political accountability is even more difficult when organizational leaders form close ties with politicians that subtly (or not so subtly) affect how the group deals with constituent issues. Progressive politicians understand the value of forming these relationships. They know that a union leader or progressive activist repeatedly invited to the White House or governor’s mansion is prone to become more protective of the politician that grants such access. Even when an organization wants to hold a supposedly friendly politician accountable, the politician has many tactics to delay, damage, or deny fulfillment of the organization’s agenda. Politicians employ highly paid consultants to develop strategies for achieving their goals; social change activists must employ their own strategies for using politicians to fulfill their agendas.
“WE’RE WITH YOU WHEN YOU’RE WITH US, AND AGAINST YOU WHEN YOU’RE NOT”
After Jerry Brown’s reelection as California governor in 1978, an unusual alliance developed between Brown and antiwar activists Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda. Hayden had formed a statewide citizens’ organization in the mid-1970s called the Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED) and had run a high-profile, though unsuccessful, challenge to California’s incumbent Democratic senator, John Tunney, in the 1976 primary.
When Hayden was challenged over his organization’s apparent alliance with the then–very fiscally conservative Brown, he claimed that CED would support the governor when he supported the group’s stand on issues and oppose him when he opposed its position. While some saw Hayden’s assessment of the ideal relationship between social activist organizations and elected Officials as simply designed to bring CED more power, this ideal is the best model for tactical activists in dealing with elected Officials.
The ideal of supporting candidates only when they support your positions may seem obvious; the difficulty lies in the implementation. Elected Officials value personal loyalty above all else; because tactical activists must place their constituency’s agenda over the politician’s, the potential for conflict always exists. The strains of this tension are most severe when a self-styled neighborhood activist or progressive is elected to office. These Officials, feeling entitled to the unwavering loyalty of neighborhood and progressive organizations, argue that any criticism from the political left lends comfort to their conservative enemies. Adopting a “tough love” stance toward such Officials thus makes many activists feel disloyal or, even worse in the current political world, “unreasonable” or “too idealistic.” Nevertheless, for tactical activists striving to accomplish social change, an independent stance brings both power and respect; to succeed, they must accept the credo that, in regard to elected Officials, it is better to be feared than loved.
Let us recall what Texas organizer Ernesto Cortes, Jr., said: “We got where we are because [politicians] fear and loathe us.” Cortes arrived at this conclusion not after years of battling exclusively with conservatives who refused to deal fairly with his Latino constituency, but rather after dealing with his many political allies. Among COPS’s closest allies was then–San Antonio mayor Henry Cisneros, later Clinton’s secretary of housing and urban development. Rather than revel in Cisneros’s historic victory as the city’s first Latino mayor and then sit meekly by as promises were broken and commitments left unfulfilled, COPS demanded performance. When Cisneros failed to perform, COPS publicly attacked him for ignoring his constituency’s concerns. Unlike far too many progressive groups, Cortes says, COPS does not endeavor to be liked by politicians: “When we start worrying whether or not politicians like us . . . then we’ll be just like everybody else.”3
I wish I could say that Cortes is wrong and that fear need not be used to motivate elected Officials. It would be so much easier if progressive constituencies were treated with the same respect as large financial donors. It would also be great if activists could relate on some basis other than intimidation to politicians they have supported. Cortes’s comments, however, mirror my own experiences with many politicians. Far too many take the low-income constituencies whose votes help elect them for granted. Activists who put their constituencies’ needs ahead of the politician’s agenda must be willing to sacrifice friendship with the Official in order to achieve their goals.
Tactical activists must let Officials know when they are right and when they are wrong. Politicians deserve public credit when they fight hard for fairness and social justice. The favorable publicity they receive will prompt similar conduct in the future. But there is virtually never an excuse for silently allowing a supposed ally to act against your constituency. Particular members of an organization or constituency may have personal reasons not to protest, publicly or privately, a wayward vote, but tactical activism requires that some element of the constituency take such action. Organizations that engage in the necessary strategic and tactical discussions in formulating a proactive agenda will have determined in advance when and how to respond to betrayal by a supposed political friend.
This chapter offers both local and national case studies of political accountability. I begin with my personal experience dealing with San Francisco mayors, and go on to discuss how the lessons that national environmental groups learned about “fear and loathing” early in the Clinton administration helped the movement strengthen the Clean Air Act in his second term and delay and potentially defeat construction of the Keystone XL oil pipeline during the Obama administration. I then describe how immigrant rights’ and gay rights’ groups initially took contrasting approaches toward holding President Obama’s feet to the fire on key campaign commitments. A less experienced immigrant rights movement failed to hold Obama accountable for inaction on comprehensive immigration reform, and was quiet too long as the administration increased the number of deportations. It was not until young DREAM Activists applied a fear-and-loathing approach to the president that