Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche. Henri LefebvreЧитать онлайн книгу.
institutions and their particular functions (family, nations and corporations, cities and regions of the national territory), the system of needs and the division of labour (which corresponds precisely to needs). Just as consciousness has a triple origin (sensation, practical activity, abstraction), which raises it to the higher level of political consciousness, so the state has a triadic origin: productive work, history and its conflicts, and socio-political practice that brings it to perfection. These associated and interacting triplicities produce a living totality both organic and rational: the state. Viewed genetically, this is nothing other than reasoning humanity, obeying the call of the Idea, which produces itself in the course of history. In short, the state cements and crowns the social body, which without this would fragment into pieces, would atomize – if such a hypothesis makes any sense.
The Hegelian fetishism of the state may frighten the citizen or the reader of a philosophical work, and the summary that will be submitted (once more) to such a reader may perhaps appear monstrous, without any relationship to political reality. But this impression will fade as soon as the exposition goes into the detail of the Hegelian analysis and synthesis, which are striking and astonish by their character, both concrete and actual (modern).
b) According to Hegel, the rational, thus constitutional, state, has a social basis: the middle class. It is in this class that culture is located, which connects with the consciousness of the state. There is no modern state without a middle class, its foundation for both intelligence and legality.6 Neither the peasants nor the workers, the working and productive classes, can constitute pillars of the state. It is from this middle class that civil servants are recruited, either by co-optation or by competition.7 A competent bureaucracy, selected by tough examinations, is the true social basis and substance of the state.
For Hegel, there are thus social classes and even struggles (contradictions) between these classes: the natural class, the peasants, rooted in the soil; the active reflective class, artisans and workers, who produce the accumulation of wealth, these individuals being characterized by their (subjective) skill; and finally the thinking class, mediator between the two productive classes, and itself mediated by its knowledge, which maintains and manages the social whole within the context of the state. These three classes constitute civil society, with its intermediary (mediation) towards politics, in other words, the bureaucracy, emerging from the thinking class (middle: intermediary, mediating and mediated). Conflicts between these classes, the elements (moments) of civil society, press this outside and above itself, towards the establishment of a political class, directly (immediately, that is, without mediation) bound up with the state and thus constituting its apparatus. It is the upper fringe of the bureaucracy that constitutes (institutes in the constitution) the lower part of the personnel in power, around princes, monarchs and heads of state.
Thus, it is the contradictions (the internal dialectic) of civil society that engender the state and the political class. This latter, representing and effecting state action, can turn back on its own conditions; it has the capacity of recognizing (social) relations between the moments (elements, members, phases/stages) of civil society, of detecting their conflicts and resolving them, in such a way that the state is preserved as a coherent totality encompassing contradictory moments. With this aim, the ruling stratum (political class) is entitled to free itself from all other tasks and obligations, and consequently to receive prizes and rewards (honours, money) for exercising its responsibility. The result is that this fundamentally honest class, the summit of the pyramid, does not only represent the social substance: it is this substance, in other words ‘the life of the whole’, the constant production (reproduction) of society, state, constitution, the political act itself, which consists in governing.8
Philosophy, for its part, is the duplicate and shadow of the completed political system: the perfect philosophical system consecrates, legitimates, founds it. Philosophy as such is perfected in Hegelianism, which sums up and condenses its history; it finds full realization in the state to which the system brings theory. Philosophy accompanies the state as a public service. In the same way that the state rationally totalizes its historical, practical, social, cultural and other ‘moments’, so the philosophico-political system unites the rational and the real, the abstract and the concrete, the ideal and the actual, the possible and the accomplished. Knowledge (theoretical) and practice (socio-political) likewise coincide in administrative savoir faire.
The consequence, or rather the logical implication of this, is that history has reached an end. In terms of production, it has generated everything that it could generate. When? With the French Revolution and Napoleon.9 Why? Because the Revolution and Napoleon produced what supersedes and consecrates them: the nation-state. Marked by struggle and emergence – the figures of the individual and social consciousness, the phases of cognition – historicity re-produces its initial condition and its final content: the Idea. It contains three moments: productive work, self-generated conceptual knowledge and the creative struggle through which the higher moment is born from the lower, dominating this by subjecting (and thereby preserving) it. Origin (hidden) and end (manifest) of all things, of every act and every event, the Idea recognizes itself in the plenitude of the state. Accident and contingency are either non-existent, or no more than apparent. With the modern state time comes to an end, and the result of time is displayed (actualized in total presence) in space. This is the twilight of creation, the setting sun, the West! The trinity or speculative triad (work, action, thought) is completed in its triumph, and enters into its starry night. Into mortal wisdom.10
Who would not feel a frisson of terror at comparing the monstrous (monstrously rational) character of Hegel’s theory of the state with the concrete character of the detailed analyses that support and actualize this? The rise of the middle class above the working classes; the growing socio-economic importance of this middle class, combined with its illusory political importance; the subordination of this socio-economic ‘base’ to a bureaucracy; a technocracy; an upper class that emerges from the middle class; the formation of a political class – all these aspects of ‘modernity’ were grasped, foreseen, announced by Hegel at the start of the nineteenth century. Along with this was the revelation of another aspect that is overlooked, ignored or dissimulated in the modern world: the true portrait of the monster, seen from its cruelly thinking head to its active members – the superhuman and too human giant of the state.
We shall have to return to this paradox: Hegel’s tripod monster and his rational vision, the philosopher’s approval and the good conduct certificate given by philosophy, the juncture of knowledge and power, of Western logos and raison d’état, this intolerable ensemble of ‘truth’. Starting from this central conception: the Hegelian state produced its moments, its elements, its materials, in historical time. In the resulting space, it re-produces them in an immobile movement. Since ‘each member dissolves as soon as it sets itself apart’, the movement, the revolving sphere, the round, in a word, the system, are also ‘transparent and serene rest’, in the words of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus, the Hegelian state offers the model of a self-generated and self-maintained system that regulates itself, in other words, the perfect automatism.11 Architectonic colossus, necessary and sufficient, it is so. Es ist so. (These were supposedly the last words of the dying Hegel.)
5) Let us now reconsider what is currently known as ‘Marxism’. (Do I need to repeat that this is not the first time and will not be the last either?)
Preliminary remark: Hegelianism can be defined as a system. True, specialists in the history of philosophy are familiar with the difficulties arising from the diversity of Hegel’s texts and their dates. Agreement between Hegel’s phenomenology (description and linkage of figures and moments of consciousness, both for the individual and for humanity in its progress) and his logic (which includes the relation of formal logic, theory of coherence, with dialectic, theory of contradictions), as well as with history (sequence of struggles, violence, wars and revolutions), has nothing like Cartesian self-evidence. Yet we can be confident that Hegelian thought, in the course of the philosopher’s life, focused in a definable direction, that of the philosophical and political system.
What then of Marxism? This is only a word, a political label, a polemical amalgam. Only an outdated dogmatism