Talkative Polity. Florence Brisset-FoucaultЧитать онлайн книгу.
money and you can drive as many cars as you want.38
These actors were very attached to a certain kind of political and economical liberalism. They did support Museveni, but not because of any partiality toward the “grassroots democracy” institutions and mythology that are at the core of the NRM discourse and project. Far from being militants or even adhering to the NRM’s political philosophy, these men’s opinions illustrate the position of a large part of the Ganda elite of the 1980s who, as Mikael Karlström said, were “hoping when the NRM came to power in 1986, for a more benign political order and an economic climate which would allow them to reconstitute their class position.”39 And indeed, the faction of the Ganda elite engaged in industrial and business activities benefited quickly from the regime change, especially the ones who chose to cultivate close ties with the new leadership.40
The historicals qualified their actions and political preferences as “apolitical” and were very reluctant to turn these preferences into open support. They manifested their political opinions through individual micropractices of sociability, such as private meetings, and the Ekimeeza was clearly seen as an extension of this. As one of them explained:
[Thanks to the Ekimeeza], people have really seen who were the Salehs [president’s half brother], that they could be approached. . . . I think it really helped us politically. Even if I am not engaged in politics.
Q: What do you mean when you say “us”?
A: I mean the Movement. I don’t want to say that I am not a Movement man, even if I am not engaged in politics. Because I am behind the Movement. I am behind Museveni. Because of the experience I had in Obote’s time, in Amin’s time. I saw a big change and I appreciate it. [. . .] I don’t have money to put in politics, but I campaign for them. [. . .] I inform people. I talk for them in private circles.41
Founding members preferred intellectual and discreet ways of engaging in politics, and some tried, for example, to promote a dialogue between the central government and Mengo behind the scenes, which recalled the forms of engagement used by the Ganda conservative elite under the protectorate.42 According to the Ekimeeza historicals, political relations had to remain a private affair, anchored in sociability and paradoxically defined as “apolitical.” The decision to broadcast the discussions was thus criticized by some because it broke this discreet pattern of political involvement.
For the historicals, being a “Movement man” while “not being engaged in politics” was not contradictory. Generally speaking, founding members of the Ekimeeza had very few political experiences in their youth. Contrary to other portions of the Buganda elite or aspiring elite, they had not supported the Bush War and were even less engaged in it.43 Some supported the NRM financially, as many businessmen do in Kampala. But once again, they did not define this as something “political,” as one explained:
I got what I wanted, which was peace. [. . .] I went out of politics. Apart from supporting the NRM when there’s fund-raising, but apart from that I am just a [professional] and a businessman.
Q: But still you give some money . . .
A: To the party yes, if I can, I do.
Q: You are an official member of the party?
A: I am not, but I am a supporter of the party. I don’t have any cons. For me, my aim was to have peace. Peace that would do to make a better country for my children, my children to be happy. You know, before, you could not have a building like this with just glass [he waves toward a huge skyscraper]. You need to have ugly [concrete] . . . so for me, what is here is a good thing.44
The Ekimeeza was born out of the attachment to intellectual political debate rather than radical ideals of democracy. It had nothing to do with the model of the Resistance Councils, in which these men were not interested.45 In a certain way, the beginnings of Ekimeeza reflected an ideal of a bourgeois liberal public sphere and a desire to be distinguished from the citizenship promoted by the Movement.
These men’s moderate position toward Ganda royalism should also be noted, and can again be better understood by taking into account their socioeconomic status and trajectories. The historicals considered they had benefited from the change of regime and did not come from radical royalist family backgrounds. They did not see their social and moral fulfillment as being ontologically linked with the restoration of the kingdom. Their attachment, in some cases, to the institution of kingship and to the king in person did not encourage any support for the radical royalist politics of the 1990s and the 2000s, but led instead to a desire to act as intermediaries and to protect a certain social and economical stability, in accordance with their discreet comprehension of political action.
Nor were they champions of multipartyism. As a matter of fact, the historicals’ attachment to the Movement system also came from their own strong hostility to party politics. Their position reflects how Museveni’s leftist historical diagnosis of the necessity of avoiding political parties on the count that African societies were not divided along class lines was amalgamated with an elitist hostility to mass party politics seen as vulgar and perilous.46 For these highly educated men, the absence of party politics was regarded as a condition for a sane and high-quality debate, based on personal ideas rather than party discipline or ethnic and religious identities. Their hostility to party politics was intertwined with an ideal of political engagement that had to be very light, discreet, and intellectual, and that thus diverged from the “official” Movement ideology. This was reflected in the comments the historicals made on the new generations of Ekimeeza speakers, whom they often accused of “politicizing” excessively the topics of discussion. As James Wasula explained:
I don’t like [political] parties. They tend to oppose anything, so whatever topic you bring they will be on the opposition. It’s funny—I don’t know how it happens, but that’s how it happens.
Q: It also depends on how you write the question, actually—
A: No. It’s so funny. [. . .] There was a topic on football and people who would not support were all from the opposition.
Q: Didn’t support what?
A: You know, there was [. . .] a committee which was administering the administration of football in Uganda, so we wanted to talk about football and actually the invited guests were mainly from the football fraternity. But the few that participated from Ekimeeza, those who opposed the topic, were from the opposition. And it had nothing to do with politics (he laughs).47
The “partisanization”48 of the Ekimeeza was regretted and associated with sterile debate, emotionality, and lack of content. For the historicals, on the contrary, not being in a party reflected a certain political sophistication and independence of mind, and the fact that the opinions expressed were based on the strength of arguments rather than political discipline. Political competition and antagonisms, however, were far from absent from the Ekimeeza, as we will see in detail in the next chapters.
The Social Composition of Ebimeeza Audiences
As mentioned, founding members invited their famous friends to attend the discussions. This was an extension of their usual social and political practices and ensured the maintenance of a certain standing.49 But it was also a commercial strategy. The presence of political celebrities, in particular Capt. Mike Mukula, former minister of health; Tim Lwanga, at that time minister of ethics and integrity; Capt. Francis Babu, former minister of work, housing, and communications; and Nyombi Thembo, minister of the Luwero Triangle, attracted more people.50 Exclusive sociability had thus an ambivalent dimension: high connections were indeed the privilege of a happy few, but the commercial and social value of the Ekimeeza was to make these connections public, and to make more people feel part of the circle.
And indeed, from the end of the year 2000, the audience of the debate enlarged progressively. A new generation of speakers began to attend. They were