Tafelberg Short: The Zuma Moment. Aubrey MatshiqiЧитать онлайн книгу.

      On 14 June 2005, South African politics entered a new phase: the Jacob Zuma Moment. It is on this fateful day that tensions and divisions within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) started peaking. It is on this day that former president, Thabo Mbeki, not only sealed his political fate but also set in motion political events that will leave an indelible mark on the South African political landscape for many years to come.

      A few days before, on 2 June 2005, Judge Hilary Squires read a judgment which, contrary to what many expected, would catapult Jacob Zuma to the presidency of the ANC and South Africa. How did a man and struggle hero who was destined to descend into the depths of political ignominy become one of the most important political forces in South African political history?

      On 2 June 2005 Schabir Shaik, former financial adviser to Jacob Zuma, was convicted on charges of fraud and corruption. This will probably be remembered less because Zuma was the co-accused than for the fifteen-year sentence Judge Squires handed down. Both the fact that Zuma was the co-accused in the court of public opinion, and that the then National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) and head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Bulelani Ngcuka, made an unfortunate prima facie statement, laid a poor political platform for the corruption case against Zuma. They also laid a solid foundation for the destruction of Thabo Mbeki and Zuma’s ascendance to the throne.

      If Zuma is unseated as president of the ANC in the ANC conference in Mangaung at the end of 2012, he may one day want to curse both Ngcuka and Mbeki for his fall from grace. Back in December 2007, however, he probably wanted to kiss them for setting in train a series of events that led to his installation as president of the ANC at the 2007 Polokwane conference and of the country in May 2009. The question is whether the Christmas present of December 2007 will turn into a poisoned chalice in December 2012.

      Back in August 2003, it seemed reasonable to surmise that Zuma had a case to answer. But Ngcuka in his capacity as the NDPP told the media that although he had a prima facie case against Zuma, he would not prosecute because he did not believe the NPA had a winnable case. Did Ngcuka make a political or prosecutorial decision? And, which of the allegations against him and the former president, in the public and private domains, could have led to what ANC secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, sometimes refers to as the ‘Polokwane rebellion’?

      In trying to make sense of the issues raised by this question, four things are worth noting.

      First, rumour and gossip play an important role in shaping the political conduct, choices and decisions of members of the ruling party. When it comes to the social and political function of rumour and gossip in a party like the ANC, there are times when the political impact of a perception is more influential than whether the perception is grounded in truth or not. As we shall see later, the supporters of Zuma and Mbeki understood this very well.

      Second, Mac Maharaj and Mo Shaik, who operated in the underground military and intelligence structures of the ANC when Zuma was head of ANC intelligence, believed Ngcuka’s prima facie gaffe was informed more by political calculations and less by legal considerations. It is for this reason that they sought to prove Ngcuka was an apartheid spy.

      Third, there were rumours at the time of the prima facie controversy that Ngcuka had gone against the legal opinion of more than one senior advocate.

      Fourth, according to an article in polity.org, Tony Leon, former leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), wrote a letter to Kgalema Motlanthe in his capacity as secretary-general of the ANC.[1] In this letter, Leon wanted to know whether Mbeki would seek a third term as head of state. This followed assurances that the former president, Nelson Mandela, had given the nation, seemingly out of the blue, when he spoke at the official opening of the Mandela Bridge in Johannesburg; he said Mbeki would not seek a third term as president of South Africa. These assurances – which Leon obviously did not believe despite Motlanthe’s own assurance that the ANC had never discussed the matter – coincided with rumours that Mbeki would seek a third term not only as ANC president but as president of the country too. Could it be that Mandela had become aware of another rumour – the rumour that legal opinion had been sought on behalf of the former president, given that the Constitution limits incumbents to two presidential terms?

      The extent to which the rumours, gossip and speculation informed the content of the Polokwane rebellion is still a mystery. What is certain, however, is that the climate of rumour and suspicion formed the backdrop to Mbeki’s speech on 14 June 2005. Early in the speech Mbeki said: ‘Among others, and relevant to the reason I requested this Joint Sitting, the Executive must discharge its responsibilities within the context of the rule of law, which includes respect for the integrity and independence of the judiciary and presumption of innocence of any person, pending findings of the courts. Similarly, we also have to respect decisions of our Parliament.’[2]

      As we shall see later, in the two-and-a-half years that followed, Zuma’s supporters questioned the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law and the independence of the NPA. Commenting on the judgment by Squires, Mbeki went on to say, ‘I have since carefully studied the Judgement. I did this fully to inform myself about Justice Squires’ findings, given the fact that the issue of the relationship between the Deputy President, the Honourable Jacob Zuma, and the accused had been canvassed during the trial.’ He then reminded members of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces that ‘the court has made findings against the accused and at the same time pronounced on how these matters relate to our Deputy President, the Hon Jacob Zuma, raising questions of conduct that would be inconsistent with expectations that attend those who hold public office’.

      As some people commented at the time, it was strange that Zuma had not been prosecuted with Shaik given that he had been mentioned in the charge sheet almost as frequently.

      Then came the moment that sealed Mbeki’s fate; he announced to a stunned but not surprised nation that, ‘as President of the Republic I have come to the conclusion that the circumstances dictate that in the interest of the Honourable Deputy President, the Government, our young democratic system, and our country, it would be best to release the Hon Jacob Zuma from his responsibilities as Deputy President of the Republic and Member of the Cabinet.’

      The announcement was the beginning of the end for his political career.