Hybrid. Ruth ColkerЧитать онлайн книгу.
are many ways to deal with this problem. One common method is to insist that the words lesbian, gay, or bisexual are modifiers rather than nouns. In the disability rights movement, that linguistic move is commonplace. The preferred term is “person with a disability” to emphasize that an individual is a “person” who also has a disability. Unfortunately, that construction is a bit awkward. One would have to say, for example, I am a person who is bisexual, able-bodied, Jewish, white, middle-aged, middle-class, androgynous, and so forth, in order to emphasize that no one aspect of our identity defines us. Such constructions, however, are often preferable to such shorthand phrases as “the disabled” which suggest that one’s entire existence is defined by one’s disability status.
Labels can also help overcome the practical limitations of storytelling. For example, when asked about my sexual orientation, I could say, “I am currently married to a man but find both men and women sexually attractive” rather than say “I am a bisexual.” That kind of storytelling could emphasize the fluid way that I define my sexual orientation. Unfortunately, such storytelling is not always practical. Moreover, in cases such as mine, most people probably just attach the label “married woman” to me with its assumptions about exclusive heterosexuality without even inquiring about my sexual orientation. Use of a simple category such as “bisexual” can force people to move quickly beyond their assumptions about my sexual orientation even if that label is problematic. One can hope that once a person learns that I attach the label “bisexual” to myself despite my married status that that individual would approach me and ask what the term “bisexual” means to me. At that time, I could try to describe the phrase’s fluid meaning to me.
If it is true that far more people have experienced a bisexual lifestyle than is commonly recognized, why is bisexuality so often ignored?34 Ignoring bisexuality allows society to perpetuate the stereotype that sexuality is rigidly dichotomous. That stereotype is male and white in that it hides women’s and African-American men’s sexual feelings and experiences.35 Theologian John J. McNeill describes the impoverishment of the bipolar imagery of homosexuality and heterosexuality which is prevalent in our society:
The tendency to identify oneself as a person with one’s sexual-identity image can, and frequently does, lead to a one-sided stress on certain qualities and the elimination of others. The heterosexual tends to define himself in contrast to the homosexual; the homosexual, in turn, tends to define himself in contrast to the heterosexual. The result is a narrow, impoverished, and dehumanizing self-image for both parties.36
McNeill’s argument helps emphasize the importance of defining bisexuality with regard to feelings as well as conduct. In the Ms. Magazine study, many women described their sexual orientation based on their feelings of attraction toward men and women rather than based on their experiences in sexual relationships. Similarly, Weinberg found a much higher incidence of bisexuality among women if he inquired about their sexual feelings rather than sexual behaviors.37 A more humanistic understanding of sexuality therefore would go beyond our conduct and try to understand our feelings. Since only our conduct is readily visible, this observation challenges each of us to verbalize our feelings about our sexuality in order to help society move beyond a narrow, noncontextual, and rigid understanding of sexuality. Saying the word “bisexual” aloud can help us begin to verbalize those feelings.
Finally, embracing the category of bisexuality would help society recognize that one can find an organizing principle other than biological sex to define sexual attractiveness. The labels homosexual and heterosexual are premised on the concept that biological sex is an organizing principle in the selection of a sexual partner. Only bisexuality challenges the significance that biological sex should have in one of the most important activities in our lives—our choice of sexual partner. As Weinberg reports: “instead of organizing their sexuality in terms of the traditional gender schema, bisexuals do so in terms of an ‘open gender schema,’ a perspective that disconnects gender and sexual preference, making the direction of sexual desire (toward the same or opposite sex) independent of a person’s own gender (whether a man or a woman).”38 This is a powerful message so long as people do not indulge in the stereotype that bisexuals are attracted to everyone. Bisexuals have organizing principles for determining whom they find attractive; that organizing principle simply is not biological sex.
Similarly, multiracial status in the United States is largely rendered invisible through our use of racial bipolar categories. As we will see in chapters 5 and 8, our legal system pervasively has insisted that people classify themselves as white or black with no room to check off a multiracial box. Accordingly, multiracial groups in the United States have begun to organize politically to proclaim their right to be counted as multiracial. In contrast to sexual orientation, however, no clear consensus exists that multiracial categories are appropriate or desirable. Because nearly all African-Americans are, in fact, of multiracial heritage, some people argue that recognizing the multiracial category will dilute the number of people recognized as African-American. This disagreement reflects the inherently political nature of such categories; the categories do not have any intrinsic meaning. If we recognize that categories are artificial because human behavior and experience exist on a spectrum, then we can be mindful of the implications of categories as we create them. The fact that we use certain categories for census reporting does not mean that we have to use them in the context of affirmative action.
Ongoing controversies over racial identity re-emphasize the point made earlier that racial identity is not entirely a biological or anthropological construct. Although we tend to think of race as a given, some people clearly make choices concerning their racial identity. The very existence of a multiracial identity movement, therefore, represents a positive political development because it emphasizes the socially constructed aspects of racial identity. It draws people’s attention to the fact that we make decisions about how to label people racially. There is no “natural” racial categorization system.
Disability categorization also creates controversy although the dimensions of the problems are different. As with racial minorities, there is no monolithic understanding within or outside of the community of people with disabilities as to whom should get covered by various statutes. For example, people often complain that the Americans with Disabilities Act should not cover physical problems such as obesity. These comments are often premised on inaccurate stereotypes of such people, rooted in a belief that they “choose” their disability or are responsible for their problems. Real life stories can help overcome those stereotypes. In one poignant exchange on the internet, someone with a disability complained about people who are obese being considered disabled because they could control their weight. An obese individual wrote back, explaining that a physiological condition precluded her from losing weight; she also documented the extensive discrimination she suffered because of her body size. The original writer immediately recanted his criticism, ironically noting that his own disabilities precluded him from gaining weight. Yet, it had never occurred to him that people who are obese also can have physiological problems affecting their body weight. By putting a story behind the labels, these individuals were able to overcome their stereotypes. Had there been no way to identify the subcategory of “obesity” within the label “disabled,” this helpful exchange might not have occurred.
B. Categories Can Serve Ameliorative Purposes
Not only are categories needed to facilitate ordinary conversation, but they are needed for legislative purposes. We have to define who is “gay, lesbian, or bisexual” if we are to create nondiscrimination statutes, same-sex partner registration, or affirmative action.
Similarly, we need categories in the race context to develop affirmative action. Who should qualify for such programs? The Hylton controversy brings this question explicitly to the forefront. Why do we have affirmative action? Should Hylton have been rendered ineligible because of her economic background, unwillingness to promise to serve as a “black” role model, or because of her racial background, light skin, or conservative politics? We need to articulate more precisely why we have affirmative action