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fast-attack patrol vessels, and technology to produce ballistic missiles and chemical weapons,” writes Tzvi Kahn, a Senior Policy Analyst for the Foreign Policy Initiative.25 Iran’s naval commander visited China to discuss broader military cooperation shortly before the incidents in the Gulf.26
Preparing for both Iranian and Chinese naval threats is straining the U.S. Navy’s current force structure.27
At the same time, Russia, long a partner of Tehran’s, has just announced the sale of an $800 million, S-300 missile-defense system to Iran. Coming just as Iran began formalizing the nuclear deal with the United States, the missile-defense sale is illustrative. It suggests that Iran is emboldened by the arrangements it has made with Washington, while also preparing itself, defensively, for any consequences of breaching the agreement—especially since the Americans insist that the “military option” remains “on the table” should Iran violate the terms. Putin just made it easier for Iran to do so.
“That deal represents a lot of money to Russia and a system Iran wants,” said Russian expert Tom Nichols, a professor at the Naval War College. “From their perspective, why bother waiting? What price would be paid if they do it? This is what happens when other countries in the world feel they can act as if the United States doesn’t exist.” The missile-defense deal, he continued, was “yet another moment where Russia and Iran underscore the reality that they can do whatever they like, unconstrained by a disengaged United States.”28
The S-300 sale reflects a deepening alliance between Moscow and Tehran that has developed over certain shared goals, all of which revolve, in some form or another, around checking American influence in the Middle East and around the world. Thus, Moscow has worked assiduously to help Tehran get closer to where it can reach its “breakout” nuclear capacity—after which point, a whole new reality will take shape. That explains why Tehran has dragged out the talks so long; time is its ally, and the Russians are helping them build more nuclear facilities. In 2014, Moscow announced agreement to help Iran build two more nuclear reactors in Bushehr. Moscow and Tehran have also found common cause in Syria, where they support the Assad regime, and they have played an indispensable role in its survival. Both countries are working together to blunt international sanctions against them—Iran because of its nuclear program, Russia for its annexation of Crimea and violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The two countries have reached an agreement for Russia to market $20 billion of Iranian crude oil on the world market, weakening the U.S. effort to shut down Tehran’s oil revenues.
According to Amir Taheri, the Russians have a phrase, fortochka Obama: the “Obama window of opportunity.” It refers to the sense among many internationally that there will never be a better time than now to make advances and claims, while the United States is saddled with such dilatory leadership. As Taheri summarizes: “By the time the ‘fortochka Obama’ is closed, Moscow and Tehran hope to have consolidated a firewall spanning a vast territory from the Baltics to the Persian Gulf, shielding them against what Putin and Iranian ‘Supreme Guide’ Ali Khamenei designate as ‘American schemes.’”29
The “fortochka Obama” has been left wide open in Syria, where 2,000 Russian troops have been deployed30 along with tanks and dozens of aircraft31 to prop up Assad’s government and supplement his military. Russia has also begun to lay the groundwork for even wider involvement, building an additional weapons depot and military facility north of the city of Latakia, Assad’s stronghold.32 Putin claims he is backing Assad only to defeat ISIS, because the West has done little to stem the rise of the would-be caliphate. But the facts tell a different story: Putin is playing both sides of the Syria crisis, while America sits on the sidelines. The FSB, Russia’s security service and replacement for the KGB, has established a “green corridor” to allow would-be Russian jihadists, especially from Chechnya, to reach Syria and join up with ISIS.33 While Putin backs Assad overtly and ISIS covertly, America has spent $500 million to train a grand total of “four or five” rebels, according to Senate testimony from General Lloyd Austin.34 In Syria, Putin saw the window of opportunity and climbed through.
Russia must sense that same window of opportunity when it comes to North Korea, with whom it has recently entered into a highly touted “year of friendship,” in 2015, during which the two countries will explore deepening their economic and political ties. What some have called a “pariah alliance” would unite two of the most destabilizing actors on the world scene. We have yet to see how substantial the ties become, but, at minimum, a closer embrace with Moscow will help Pyongyang defy American attempts to isolate and punish the Kim regime.35
The Russian outreach may be doubly important to North Korea these days, since China, Pyongyang’s principal sponsor in the world—often its only sponsor—has shown increasing impatience with Kim’s refusal to make economic reforms and especially with his continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most recently, North Korea test-launched a submarine-based ballistic missile, showing capabilities greater than what most observers had projected and leading analysts to believe that the regime could have a submarine fleet equipped with such missiles within five years.
But what has long caused the most worry around the world is the regime’s nuclear-weapons production capabilities. In a remarkable meeting with U.S. nuclear specialists in April, Chinese nuclear experts warned that Pyongyang’s ability to produce nuclear weapons has advanced well beyond American estimates. The Chinese now believe that the North may have as many as 20 warheads and the capacity to double that count within the next year, via its stocks of weapons-grade uranium.36 Already, the United States is concerned about the North’s ability to mount a nuclear warhead on an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile that, while untested, would have a range of over 5,000 miles—far enough to reach the West Coast of the United States. The U.S. believes that the North has exported nuclear technology to Syria as well as missile components to Iran and Yemen. What’s striking about the recent developments is that the Chinese themselves seem worried; up until recently, they had generally dismissed North Korea’s capabilities. But according to Siegfried Hecker, a Stanford University nuclear scientist who attended the meeting with the Chinese experts, “They believe on the basis of what they’ve put together now that the North Koreans have enough enriched uranium capacity to be able to make eight to 10 bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium per year.”37
To be sure, we should be skeptical of Chinese concerns. Beijing has long maintained a complicated, good cop–bad cop relationship with its troublesome Communist ally. For example, despite its recent criticisms of the North Korean nuclear program, Beijing—through a secretive, Hong Kong–based business—is providing Pyongyang with massive amounts of foreign exchange, which is critical for the ongoing viability and stability of Kim’s secretive regime.38 The Chinese have an interest in propping up that regime, if only to prevent the chaos—including a likely refugee flood—that would follow any governmental collapse. The Chinese would prefer a more stable government, but North Korea continues to serve Chinese interests as an economic vassal and as a counterweight to South Korea and a threat to the United States. North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities should motivate Washington to bolster security—including a robust missile defense. We should not count on getting any help from China.
CYBER WARFARE, MILITARY AND NUCLEAR BUILDUPS, ECONOMIC EXPANSION
The Russia-China axis, as we call it in this book, is not just worrisome because of individual military flashpoints, as in Eastern Europe or in the Pacific; and not only because of both countries’ consistent and expanding facilitation of rogue actors. It is also a cause of great concern because, in multiple other arenas, both countries are aggressively fortifying themselves for growth and assertion around the world.
For years, both countries have been eating America’s lunch in the game of espionage and cyber warfare. We devote two chapters of this book to their efforts in these areas. As we went to press, the Obama administration revealed one of the largest breaches of federal-employee data in history, concerning at least 4 million current or former government workers. The breached data was held by the Office of Personnel Management, and the target appeared to be Social Security Numbers. No allegations were made, but intelligence officials believe that the attack originated from China—though