A Republic No More. Jay CostЧитать онлайн книгу.
he committed himself to its defense. Largely absent during the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton joined the fray with characteristic vigor. He and Madison joined with John Jay, the architect of the Treaty of Paris, to pen the Federalist Papers, anonymous essays published in New York to promote adoption of the Constitution.
It has often been remarked that the subsequent break between Hamilton and Madison was peculiar, given their collaboration on the essays. Indeed, before historians were taking up this puzzle, contemporary observers—and even the principals themselves—pondered the nature of the divide. Often, the blame is placed upon Madison, in no small part because he became a critic of many Hamiltonian provisions that he had previously supported. Some have claimed that Madison’s change of heart was due to the spell that Jefferson had over him; when the former returned from his diplomatic duties in Paris, the latter (so the claim goes) shifted from a staunch nationalist to a skeptic of central power. Others have speculated that it was due to Madison’s Anglophobia; similarly, Hamilton once remarked that his former ally had a “womanly attachment” to France.25 Still others have suggested that regional concerns were in play; Hamilton’s economic program favored the Northeast and Madison, a member of the House during the first three Congresses, was sensitive to the worries of his Virginia constituents.
Madison, however, had a very different answer. Late in his life, in conversation with Nicholas Trist, he said:
As to (whether) I deserted Colonel Hamilton, or rather Colonel H. deserted me; in a word, the divergence between us took place—from his wishing . . . to administer the government . . . into what he thought it ought to be; while, on my part, I endeavored to make it conform to the Constitution as understood by the Convention that produced and recommended it, and particularly by the State conventions that adopted it.26
This view has gained less purchase among popular and academic writers, but it does much to squash the idea that Madison changed his mind. From his perspective, it is irrelevant that he supported certain policies before the government came into being; as long as he believed those policies violated the new governing charter, he was obliged to oppose them.
So, perhaps neither deserted the other. Perhaps instead the two were allied with one another on the first question (is the Constitution preferable to the Articles of Confederation?) but diverged on the next (what shape should federal policy take in light of this new Constitution?). This conclusion runs contrary to the conventional wisdom, which holds that Madison had flip-flopped on his attitude about the government between the time of the Federalist Papers and the inauguration of the new government. Even so, a careful reading of those famous documents supports the idea that, deep down, the two agreed less than they may once have thought.27 We have already looked closely at Madison’s thinking, so it is time to turn to Hamilton’s.
Hamilton’s contributions to the Federalist Papers are likely greater in number than Madison’s, but none is remembered in the same way as Madison’s efforts in #10 and #51. These are broad-based, largely philosophical arguments for the utility of the proposed union. Hamilton, on the other hand, was at his best in the early part of the series, with powerful jeremiads about the inevitable troubles that would befall the nation if it rejected the Constitution. Then, in the final third of the essays, he offered persuasive entries defending the new executive and judiciary. Even so, Federalist #11 comes as close as anything to outlining Hamilton’s core convictions about the potentials of the new American government, à la Madison’s ideas in #10 and #51. Read at the time of its publication, Federalist #11 may not have been as illuminating, but considered in the context of his economic program, it is perhaps his most foundational work.
In that essay, Hamilton opens with a point that reflects his cosmopolitan worldview: “The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion. . . . This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as well as each other.” He goes on to assert that the “adventurous spirit” of America has “already excited uneasy sensations . . . in the maritime powers of Europe.” He believes that a united America could “oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets.”28 In other words, Hamilton sees the possibility of a great commercial empire, one that could even force the fearsome Great Britain to deal with the United States on terms dictated by the latter.
But, as Hamilton had demonstrated in the preceding essays, disunion among the several states kept the United States from making the most of its potential. A lack of a central authority had enabled the European powers to play each state off the others, and ultimately get for themselves a better deal than they would have if Americans were bound together in a tighter union. Hamilton sees worse things to come should the states fail to unite:
It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence . . . and confine us to a passive commerce. . . . The unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.29
On the other hand, a “vigorous national government . . . directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.” But even more than this, the sort of economic coordination that could come only from a central government would bind the country together in a shared quest for ever-increasing prosperity:
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.30
Taken as a whole, Federalist #11 is a magnificently prescient statement, and a testament to the brilliance of Hamilton. Somehow, he saw beyond the America of 1787—an undeveloped, disconnected, fractious collection of states dominated by subsistence farmers—and perceived the vast economic powerhouse that the United States is today. Thanks to her commerce, America today dominates the world without having to hold a single foreign people prisoner, and Hamilton saw this potential before anybody else in the country or the world. He is the originator of the concept of American exceptionalism.
At the same time, however, the potential for conflict with Madison should be obvious. Madisonian balance and Hamiltonian prosperity are goals that are not necessarily in conflict, but they are not necessarily in harmony, either. A Hamiltonian government that promotes national development may not retain a balance between all factions; quite the contrary, it may systematically favor those deemed most helpful to the leadership’s long-term goals. In fact, as we shall see, one of Hamilton’s goals was to yoke the prosperity of the wealthy merchant class to the fate of the Union through policies that favored both. Madison was thoroughly appalled by this.
The potential for tension is especially apparent when we consider Federalist #11 in light of Hamilton’s view of the English Constitution. As mentioned above, Hamilton envisioned an executive branch almost entirely independent of swings in the mood of the public. He had a similar desire to see the Senate so inoculated. Only the House would be directly tied to the people, and here Hamilton once explained to Jefferson that he was comfortable with the executive wielding extralegal influence within that chamber, much as the king of Great Britain used patronage to acquire the votes of recalcitrant members of Parliament. In his notes, Jefferson recorded a dinner conversation he once had with John Adams and Hamilton:
Conversation began on other matters and, by some circumstance, was led to the British constitution, on which Mr. Adams observed “purge that constitution of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, & it would be the most perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man.” Hamilton paused and said, “purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, & it would become an impracticable government: as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government