Complete Works. Hamilton AlexanderЧитать онлайн книгу.
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New York, February 27, 1789.
Dear Sir:
In my last I stated a number of facts tending to prove that Mr. Clinton is not a friend of the Union. I would not be understood that either of these facts singly would authorize such a conclusion, but that it is the result of them collectively. Many men, of whose good intentions I have no doubt, have entertained similar sentiments with him on several of the points stated; but I am mistaken if there is to be found one, out of the circle of his immediate instruments, who has had or discovered the same disposition in all the particulars. I shall now briefly mention the different articles of charge.
The first is, that, while he has acknowledged the insufficiency of the old government, he has strenuously opposed the principal measures devised by the joint councils of America for supporting and strengthening it.
This admission of the insufficiency of the old confederation has not only been made in private conversations, but fully and pointedly in the late convention of this State. He has not, however, uniformly held the same language, as will be taken notice of hereafter.
To prove the latter part of the charge, I shall instance his opposition to the impost system proposed by Congress, and repeatedly urged by them as the only measure to obtain revenue, for objects of indispensable importance, on which reliance could be placed.
The first idea of a general impost for the benefit of the United States is said to have originated in a convention held at Hartford, consisting of deputies from the four New England States and from New York. The measure was agreed upon in Congress in February, 1781, at a period when the United States, after various trials of requisitions and of other expedients, were reduced to the utmost extremity of distress for want of money to carry on the war. The impost then proposed was, I believe, granted by all the States except Rhode Island. The act of this State, passed 19th of March, 1781, expressly provides, that the duties granted to Congress “should be levied and collected in such manner and form, and under such pains, penalties, and regulations, and by such officers, as Congress should from time to time make, order, direct, and appoint.”
But, on the appearance of peace, the system of our policy changed. The foregoing act was repealed by one passed the 15th of March, 1783, by which it was too apparent that the leaders of our councils, at the first dawn of peace, were resolved to desert the principles which had governed them in the time of common danger.
It is true, that the same act grants the duties anew, but to be collected by the officers and under the authority of the State; which was so essential an alteration of the plan as would have rendered it necessary (had not the opposition of Rhode Island already done so) to recommence the business in a new form, in order that all the States might stand on an equal footing.
I remain, dear sir,
Your obedient and humble servant,
H.G.
To ____, Esq., Suffolk County.
LETTER VIII
New York, February 28, 1789.
Dear Sir:
The embarrassments experienced in carrying through the first plan, the increase of the national debt, and other circumstances, induced Congress to devise a new system of impost, which was finally agreed upon on the 18th of April, 1783.
In this system, the appointment of the officers to collect the duties was referred to the several States, which it was supposed would remove the principal objection to the former plan. All the States, except New York, substantially adopted it, annexing certain precautions for the more secure exercise of the powers granted to Congress. But New York persisted to the last in withholding her assent. She passed, indeed, a law for granting an impost on different principles; but as Congress could not accept this without releasing the other States, and setting the whole business afloat, it was evident to all the world that the act of New York was nothing better than a mere evasion of the thing asked.
The Governor, undoubtedly, took an active part in opposition to this measure. It is true, he declared in the convention that he had always been a friend to the impost, but could not agree to the manner in which Congress proposed to exercise the power. This is plainly a subterfuge. He was a friend to an abstract something, which might be any thing or nothing, as he pleased; but he was an enemy to the thing proposed. A general impost, being a measure not within the provision of the confederation, could only be brought about by some general plan devised by the common councils of the Union, and submitted to the adoption of the several States. There could else be no concert, no common agreement. To oppose, therefore, the specific plan offered, and yet pretend to be a friend to the thing in the abstract, deserves no better name than that of hypocrisy.
I am possessed of unquestionable evidence, to prove that he used personal influence with members of the Legislature to prejudice them against the granting of the impost. You may obtain a confirmation of this from one of the gentlemen who represented your own county in the year 1786. The argument employed with him was, that Congress being a single body, and consequently without checks, would be apt to misapply the money arising from it. This looks like more than an objection to the mode. If the money was to be granted in any shape, that consequence, if to be apprehended at all, might follow.
A question of a very delicate and serious nature arises on the conduct of the Governor. Is it justifiable in the Chief Magistrate of a State to employ his personal influence with individual members of the Legislature in relation to any matter of public concern which is to come under their deliberation? To me an interference of this sort appears highly exceptionable.
With sincere regard,
I am, dear sir
Your most obedient servant, H. G.
To ____, Esq., Suffolk County.
LETTER IX
New York, March 2, 1789.
Dear Sir:
The second particular which I have stated, as evidence of Mr. Clinton's enmity to the Union, is, that he has treated Congress, as a body, in a contemptuous manner.
A proof of this exists in his refusal to convene the Legislature of this State in the year 1786, upon pressing and repeated supplications of Congress; sheltering himself under the frivolous pretence that the constitution did not leave him at liberty to do it.
The constitution empowers the governor to convene the Legislature “on extraordinary occasions.” This provision is evidently calculated to enable him to call together the Legislature whenever any thing of importance out of the ordinary routine of State business should occur. To put any other meaning upon it is absurd, and would embarrass the operations of government. It cannot be supposed that the constitution intended by “extraordinary occasions” nothing but wars, rebellions, plagues, or earthquakes. The word “extraordinary,” as used in this case, can only be construed as equivalent to special; and a special occasion is any thing of moment out of the common and expected course. It merits attention, that the words of the constitution are, simply, that the governor “shall have power to convene the Legislature upon extraordinary occasions.” This mode of expression has plainly an authorizing and empowering, not a restricting operation. It is true that the governor is bound, in the exercise of this power, to observe a reasonable discretion, and not to act with caprice, levity, or wantonness; but the same may be said of every other power with which he is intrusted, and does not affect the constitutional sense of the provision.
Let us now, sir, take a view of the nature of the application and refusal. The Legislature of the State, in May, 1786, passed