Fateful Triangle. Tanvi MadanЧитать онлайн книгу.
involved militarily in the US-led UN effort because it would “drag India into a US-led war against China.”135
Indian officials believed that American actions such as the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in June—even if intended as a defensive measure—would unnecessarily provoke China. Panikkar reported that the Chinese leadership differentiated between Korea, where Beijing did not want to get involved in the fighting, and Taiwan, where it would not back down. He suggested that the American approach would only push Beijing toward Moscow—a view shared by Kennan and others in the US.136 Even China skeptics like Bajpai, who believed that Beijing saw India as a “potential rival,”137 thought the American approach was counterproductive.138 He also had a parochial concern about the escalating crisis: it might mean little potential economic or military assistance “left over in the USA for us.”139
Indian officials took on what became a recurring role, urging China and the US to reassure each other. Speaking to Henderson, Bajpai conveyed Panikkar’s view that while Beijing’s fear of a US attack on the mainland might be groundless, it nonetheless saw signs of hostility: the US defense relationship with Thailand, American involvement in Indochina, UN Command chief and Supreme Allied Commander General MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan in July 1950, and the US stance at the UN. Bajpai hoped Washington would ratchet down its rhetoric and suggested ways it could alleviate Chinese concerns about its intentions, especially vis-à-vis Taiwan.140
American officials generally dismissed the Indian recommendations. Henderson told Bajpai no assurances would be forthcoming as long as China or the Soviet Union posed a threat; Beijing should already know that the US would not attack the mainland as long as China did not attack Taiwan or elsewhere in Asia.141 MacArthur stressed that Nehru would achieve nothing with “appeasement.” He dismissed Truman’s special assistant Averell Harriman’s caution about Jiang leading the US to a position on Taiwan that could cause a split with Britain and India.142 Acheson, in turn, warned London and Delhi that they would create “sharp differences” if they pushed Washington on Taiwan.143 He told Delhi that occasional statements that China wanted peace were not borne out by Chinese behavior. Its hostile words and actions toward a number of countries were driving the American attitude toward Beijing and keeping it out of the UN. Acheson asserted that Beijing, not Washington, needed to reassure others if it wanted to change perceptions of China.144
Throughout summer and fall 1950, India indeed had simultaneously urged China to temper its actions in order to reassure the US. Nehru had instructed Panikkar to inform Chinese officials that, even if India sympathized with their claims, Delhi would not support or ignore any Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by force. Indeed, it (and others) would judge China’s intentions from the way it behaved vis-à-vis Taiwan. The Indian government urged Beijing to stop threatening to use force against Taiwan and Tibet, and decrease or cease its anti-American activities. This would make it more likely that China would receive a fairer hearing at the UN. The Chinese retort to these Indian calls for restraint, however, was that the US was to blame.145
The Indian leadership did not always give China the benefit of the doubt at US expense, even though Washington might not have seen it that way. Bajpai, for instance, acknowledged conciliatory American steps. The government also recognized that Beijing could be difficult—one reason Delhi, for example, asked its representative not to vote to include it in UN talks on Korea.146 And then there was the Chinese action that raised doubts in—and had serious implications for—Delhi: its move into Tibet in October 1950.
Tibet: Lost by Default? (1950–1951)
While there had been debate in India about the timing and nature of a Chinese takeover of Tibet,147 the invasion itself was not unexpected. A year before, in September 1949, Nehru had predicted that China would invade Tibet, possibly within the year, bringing it to India’s doorstep.148 Many were aware of the consequences. Even Panikkar noted it would bring unprecedented “pressures” on India, though he did not think China would have the ability to intervene directly in India for another decade.149 Over the next year, Indian officials had continued to expect matters to “come to a head” in Tibet.150 They tried to delay this eventuality to “gain time for India” and keep the Chinese and communist influence at bay.151
Indian policymakers had crystallized their Tibet policy and conveyed it to American officials by January 1950. It basically involved “leav[ing] the matter alone.” K. P. S. Menon worried about China exporting communism via Tibet when they took over and about the status of the India-Tibet boundary.152 But he told the American political counselor that India would not take the initiative on Tibet with China. If Beijing accepted Tibetan autonomy, Delhi would recognize Chinese authority over Tibet. In the meantime, India would continue and possibly expedite its sale of small arms to Tibet and even train Tibetan officers, but it would not welcome the establishment of a Tibetan liaison office in India. Menon also emphasized that India would not take military action if China attacked Tibet.153 Delhi also resisted Anglo-American pressure to increase aid to Tibet. Finally, Menon discouraged American involvement—and particularly any discussions in Delhi—on the grounds that it would convince Beijing of a US-India anti-China conspiracy. This could expedite a Chinese takeover of Tibet.154
The US was not particularly eager to spring to Tibet’s defense. Acheson had wanted to use the threat to Tibet to convince India to move away from its “unrealism [and] semi-detached attitude” toward the Chinese challenge.155 But the US had had no desire to become embroiled alone (i.e., without India and/or the UK) by holding out the prospect of aid to Tibet. Henderson had clarified to K. P. S. Menon that the US did not want to provoke a Chinese invasion or make it harder for the Indian government to persuade Tibetan officials to accept autonomy.156 Subsequently, Washington had looked for signs of change in India’s attitude and solicited Delhi’s views on potential US-UK-Indian coordination to meet Tibet’s defense requirements. But for Acheson, ideally India had to “bear primary responsibility.”157
Delhi, on its part, had continued to eschew any covert or overt actions that Beijing might see as provocative or as part of a joint US-India effort to counter China.158 Officials did not believe that India could offer effective resistance because of Tibet’s inaccessibility and Delhi’s limited resources. There were also serious doubts about Tibetan willingness to resist. Thus the Indian government had encouraged Tibetan officials to negotiate with China.159
The outbreak of the war in Korea had increased American interest in supporting Tibet. While clarifying that assistance would not extend to direct involvement if China invaded Tibet, US officials had suggested that Tibetan officials ask India to facilitate American aid.160 But the war had not made India any more likely to help. Nehru did not think it could deter a Chinese invasion of Tibet, though officials had tried to delay it.161 They had pursued the issue on “firm [but] friendly lines” in Beijing. Bajpai had given the British high commissioner and Henderson the gist of India’s message to China: that India had gone out of its way to establish friendly relations with China even though this had been detrimental to its other bilateral relations; a Chinese invasion of Tibet might make India reassess its view of Chinese intentions, as well as its support for Beijing’s entry into the UN.162
After the invasion in October 1950, Henderson blamed India, believing that Tibet had “lost heart” because of Delhi’s reticence.163 Nonetheless, while urging India to do more and offering to be helpful, Acheson did not want to pressure India lest Delhi blame Washington for any consequent Sino-Indian complications. He did hope that, along with Chinese “duplicity in dealing with GOI [the government of India] re Korea,” developments in Tibet would make India “reassess its views re character” of the regime in Beijing.164
Henderson warned Washington against giving the impression that it was trying to use the Tibet situation to sell India on alignment with the US. He further asserted, “If [a] rift should come [between China and India] … it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of outside powers.”165 Acheson subsequently instructed