The Federalist. Hamilton AlexanderЧитать онлайн книгу.
he observes that the size of the body will increase with anticipated increases in population. Moreover, he cannot conceive of this body, subject to election every two years, as betraying the trust of the people. The essay concludes with one of his few statements concerning the relationship between virtue and republican government. Republican government, he remarks, “presupposes” qualities of human nature “which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence . . . in a higher degree than any other form.”
In answering the second charge (No. 56), that the House will be “too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents,” Publius has recourse to an argument very similar to that advanced in No. 10, namely that information relevant for national purposes, which are general in nature, can be conveyed by a relatively few individuals. The major task of representatives, as he views it, will be to assimilate the information they acquire from other representatives concerning conditions in other States and locales. Over time, however, he sees the interests within the States as becoming more numerous and diverse, while the differences between them in terms of interests will diminish.
To the charge that those elected to the House will have “least sympathy with the mass of the people” and will “be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few,” Publius recurs in paper No. 57 to the republican foundations of the system as set forth earlier in essay No. 39. He points out that the electors of the representatives are “to be the same” as those who elect members to the popular branch of the State governments and that the objects of popular choice are not constitutionally limited by requirements of wealth, profession, or religious affiliation. Beyond this, he sees various circumstances—chief among them frequent elections, along with the fact that representatives cannot pass laws that will not apply to themselves, their family, and friends, as well as their constituents—as forging a genuine bond of affection between the representatives and their constituents.
To the fourth and final charge, that “the number of members” in the House of Representatives “will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand,” he observes (No. 58) that no serious problems on this score have been encountered at the State level. Moreover, he does not foresee how a coalition of the small States would be able to prevent periodic augmentations in the size of the House. Among the reasons he cites is that the House, with the people on its side, and vested with the power of the purse, will be more than a match for the Senate or president should they attempt to thwart any increase. However, Publius takes pains to repeat his earlier concerns about an excessively large representative assembly. Any number beyond that necessary for providing “local information,” of ensuring “diffusive sympathy with the whole society,” or for “purposes of safety,” he argues, might well lessen the republican and deliberative character of the assembly.
The final three essays devoted to the House of Representatives deal with the necessity and desirability of national control over elections for national offices as set forth in Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution. These essays constitute a break between his survey of the House and his examination of the Senate.
Publius begins (No. 59) by defending national regulation of elections to national office as vital for the preservation of the national government. He maintains that if this function were to be exercised by the States, it would leave the national government at their mercy. While recognizing that the State legislatures can refuse to elect senators, he does not regard this a warrant for more extensive State control. However, he does believe that State control over House elections could lead to a crisis. In responding to Anti-Federalists who maintained that the national government might use its regulatory power to manipulate elections in order “to promote the election of some favourite class of men,” Publius answers (No. 60) that neither the people nor the States would ever stand for any such discrimination. Moreover, he regards any plan to favor “the ‘wealthy and well born’” as impracticable, because these classes are randomly distributed throughout the nation. Finally, in Federalist No. 61, he responds to the criticism that the Constitution is deficient because it contains no provision specifying the time and place of national elections. He answers by pointing out that neither the New York nor any of the other State constitutions contain such specifications, and that there have been no ill effects. He goes on to point out some of the positive advantages that will flow from the national government’s fixing a uniform time of election. Most importantly, he argues, it will ensure that the entire membership of the House will simultaneously be subject to control by the people.
E. The Senate
The Anti-Federalists viewed the Senate with mixed emotions. The vast majority favored a second chamber, and most were pleased that the States were accorded equality of representation. Yet many voiced strong criticisms of its powers, composition, and relationship to the executive branch. Beginning with essay No. 62, Publius devotes five essays to answering the most common criticisms of the Senate and to pointing out what role he anticipates it will play in providing for stable government free from the ravages of faction.
In this first paper, Publius deals with the qualifications for election to this chamber, the mode of election, and equality of State representation. He also begins his discussion concerning its size and term of office by inquiring “into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate.” Notable in this paper is his lukewarm defense of equal State representation in the Senate and his detailed analysis of the contemplated role of the Senate. Equality of representation, he maintains, is the result of a necessary compromise that “may prove more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in contemplation.” However, he views the Senate as indispensable in checking the potential excesses of the House, as well as in ensuring sound, well-conceived legislation. He is most emphatic in stressing the role of the Senate in curing the poisonous effects, both internal and external, of an “unstable government” that produces “mutable” policies.
In Federalist No. 63, Publius continues his discussion of the role of the Senate in promoting stability. It will provide, he maintains, “a sense of national character” necessary for the respect of foreign nations and the orderly conduct of international relations. He observes that the Senate, because of its stability and continuity, will also be more inclined than the House to take the successive steps sometimes necessary for the implementation of long-range goals and policies. But the bulk of the essay is devoted to a discussion of the Senate as an institution that can prevent oppressive and unjust majorities from ruling. The Senate, he argues, can serve to check such factions “until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind.”
Publius next examines (No. 64) the role of the Senate in the treaty-making process. He emphasizes its stability, as well as the intelligence, knowledge, and character of its members, that render the body suitable for this purpose. However, the essay is most notable for delineating a significant and distinct role for the president in the area of treaty negotiations. Noting that “secrecy” and “despatch” are often necessary, he praises the proposed Constitution for allowing the president sufficient latitude to take advantage of changing circumstances and to maintain secrecy in the negotiation process. In answering major criticisms of this process, he stresses that treaties, viewed as “bargains” between nations, have a different character from ordinary legislation, because the consent of the contracting parties to the treaty is necessary “to alter or cancel them.” He cannot foresee the process being abused, largely because the president and members of the Senate, as well as “their families and estates,” will be bound by the terms of treaties to the same extent as ordinary citizens.
The final two essays (of the next twenty by Hamilton) dealing with the Senate are concerned with its role in the impeachment process. The main issue discussed in No. 65 is the propriety of vesting the Senate with the power to try those impeached by the House of Representatives. Though Publius can see merit in having a “court for the trial of impeachments . . . distinct from” the regular departments of government, he notes practical difficulties and the “heavy expense” that would attend any such arrangement. In Federalist No. 66, he takes up a detailed defense of the role of the Senate in the impeachment process. The constitutional provisions, he argues, do not violate the separation of powers principles. Nor does he believe that the Senate’s role in the appointment or treaty-making processes,