Kaliningrad – an ambivalent transnational region within a European-Russian scope. Evgeniy ChernyshevЧитать онлайн книгу.

      Martinez82 based his concept of the borderlands milieu, on the study of the US-Mexico border. Such «milieu» can be affected by many cross-border and national factors, which can be grouped in such a way as to produce a typology of borderlands interaction. In the assumption of the concept of Matinez, depending on the political conjuncture the Kaliningrad region as borderland can be attributed to two groups. First, coexistent borderland is present when neighbouring states reduce tensions to a manageable level, and modest cross-border interaction occurs. Second is interdependent borderland, which involves a symbiotic relationship between border regions in adjacent countries. There is a binational economic, social and cultural system at work between the two border regions, and perhaps between their states, but a number of policies retain state separation at the boundary83. The existence of binational economic, social and cultural system at work on the level of the two border regions allows us to stress, that the Kaliningrad region nowadays can move towards the tendency of an interdependent borderland.

      In the issue, anthropological research on border cultures contributes to our knowledge of identity formation84. Taking into account the concept of Martinez, it is worth to note that the Kaliningrad borderland is bears the imprint of ambivalence, which is reflected, cultivated and maintained in the mindsets of young Kaliningradians. Because of their transborder and transnational linkages, these border cultures are often treated suspiciously by states and their agents, many of whom believe in the traditional view of the convergence of state, nation, identity and territory85. As we know the stronger rulers belief was that strict control of the frontier was essential to the maintenance of their power86. The above is manifested in the Kaliningrad regional culture, forms it and affects the everyday practices.

      It is certainly a commonplace in the interdisciplinary field of border studies that the border can only be conceptualized as being shaped and produced by a multiplicity of actors, movements and discourses. But most of these studies still perceive the practices of doing borderwork and making borders as «acts and techniques of state»87, more specifically state political institutions. Then from the empirical point, the politicization of cultural identity requires people to react against their own felt disadvantage and denigration, as well as occurring in characteristic economic and political circumstances88.

      During my empirical study I asked my respondents about the format of interaction within political, economic and cultural dimensions in the space of the borderland region and whether it is legitimate to talk about the hierarchy or the interdependence of these measurements. I have collected very different answers, which made the basis of empirical research in the light of the idea that the culture is but one element in the definition and reproduction of a political system.

      I consider the point of Strassoldo relevant who concluded that the ambivalence of border life is a defining feature of border societies in several respects89. Border people may demonstrate ambiguous identities because economic, cultural and linguistic factors pull them in two directions. They are also pulled two ways politically, and may display only a weak identification with the nation-state in which they reside. This ambivalent border identity affects the role that border communities play in international cooperation and conflict90. Everyday practice of young Kaliningradians and empirical research logically fall on this theoretical basis.

      For Anderson, borders are both institutions and processes. Anderson also stresses that «borders are markers of identity, and have played a role in this century in making national identity the pre-eminent political identity of the modern state»91.

      The frontiers are markers of identity, in the twentieth century usually of national identity, although political identities may be larger or smaller than the «nation» state. Frontiers, in this sense, are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people and sometimes myths about the «natural» unity of a territory92. These «imagined communities», to use Anderson’s93 phrase, are now a universal phenomenon and often have deep historical roots. These communities are defined by imagined boundaries, if we follow Cohen’s remark, that «where cultural difference was formerly underpinned also by structural boundaries, these have now given way to boundaries which inhere in the mind: symbolic boundaries»94. To accept this assumption, we must proceed from the fact that «human consciousness and social organization are profoundly conditioned by territory and frontiers»95. I note the importance, of how Cohen estimates symbols as a resource for identity. According to his point of view they are «pragmatic devices which