The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939–1945. Max HastingsЧитать онлайн книгу.
a night when he invented a place named ‘Senke’, near Qatara in the North African desert – having forgotten that Senke was the German word for a geographical depression. Schoolmasters proved ideal as watch chiefs, wrote Peter Calvocoressi, because they were naturally meticulous: ‘If not satisfied, they would throw back a translation at even an eminent professor. It reminded me of Chief Examiners at “A” Level who would send back scripts to an Assistant Examiner to re-mark.’ No one could work at GC&CS who did not love brain games. There were dreary, idle yet sleepless lulls, when no traffic arrived for the watches to work on. Peter Hilton once used such a doodle time to compose a palindrome: ‘DOC NOTE, I DISSENT, A FAST NEVER PREVENTS A FATNESS. I DIET ON COD’.
Although Alan Turing was acknowledged as the highest intellect at Bletchley, its achievement was supremely a team effort; the creative input of some others, Welchman prominent among them, was almost as important as that of Turing. One night in February 1940, several months before the arrival of the first bombe, twenty-one-year-old Cambridge mathematician John Herivel was smoking a pipe before the fire in his billet, and concentrating furiously on encoded messages even as he drifted in and out of a doze. An inspiration struck him as he gazed with the mind’s eye at a German Enigma operator. He perceived such a man starting his morning’s work bored or weary or hungover, and thus not troubling to change the previous day’s ring setting on his machine before starting to cipher messages. Herivel scarcely slept that night, as he went on to deduce how such an act of carelessness might be detected, then exploited to break a message.
Welchman, who had supervised him at Cambridge, immediately saw the importance of this flash of insight, a marriage of mathematical brilliance to a grasp of human weakness. He told the young man fervently that he ‘would not be forgotten’, and indeed his inspiration became known as ‘the Herivel tip’. Dillwyn Knox had already identified another entry point to messages, rooted in operator errors and text settings – what the codebreakers christened ‘Cillis’ or ‘Sillies’. Welchman wrote later that Bletchley remained ‘entirely dependent on Herivel tips and Cillis from the invasion of France to the end of the Battle of Britain’. In other words, until the arrival of the bombes, codebreaking was being done by raw brainpower, without significant mechanical assistance: at this early stage, the British lagged behind their American counterparts in exploiting technology – both the US Army and US Navy codebreaking teams used Hollerith punched-card sorters, of a kind that only began to appear at Bletchley in May 1940, because chief codebreaker Col. John Tiltman had been sceptical about them. Ultra provided no important material during the summer of 1940, but several indications about the postponement of ‘Sealion’, the Nazi invasion of Britain, notable among them a September Luftwaffe message ordering the dismantling of air transport equipment at Dutch airfields.
Fred Winterbotham, the MI6 officer who eventually became overseer of the ‘Special Liaison Unit’ network which fed Ultra decrypts to commanders in the field, described the first bombe – christened ‘Agnus’, corrupted to ‘Agnes’ – as resembling ‘some Eastern goddess who was destined to become the oracle of Bletchley’. It was installed in Hut 11 on 14 March 1940, but suffered substantial teething troubles. Gordon Welchman made an important contribution to Turing’s creation by devising a ‘diagonal board’, an element introduced into the first really effective model, which came into service in mid-August. Agnes and its many successors were not computers, because they had no memory. They were instead electro-mechanical key-finding aids, six and a half feet high and seven wide, mounted in bronze-coloured cabinets, and containing thirty-six banks of high-speed electrically-driven Enigma replicas. Each bombe contained eleven miles of wiring and a million soldered contacts. Built by the British Tabulating Machine Company at Letchworth, they depended partly on components assembled in scores of local village halls, by casual workers who had no clue of the importance to the war effort of the twenty-six-way cables and other small electrical parts they contributed.
With the assistance of a clue or ‘crib’ – a vital identifying link, usually a codebreaker’s guess about the nature of part of a given signal – a bombe could test millions of mathematical possibilities for the settings of three Enigma rotors. Figuratively, Agnes and her kin were bloodhounds needing a slipper or handkerchief to take up a scent. If there was no ‘crib’, the bombe could not solve the key – but mercifully often, there was one. Subsequent machines, miracles of reliability given their continuous operation, were given their own names by the Wrens who manned them around the clock, usually those of warships – Warspite, Victory and suchlike. The bombes did not take in enemy cipher messages and disgorge them in fluent German. They were instead priceless accelerators, once the codebreakers secured an insight into the nature of a given signal or traffic stream. Also useful was a battery of British Type-X cipher machines, modified to match the behaviour of Enigmas, on which Wren operators tested speculative message solutions. One of the principal constraints on codebreaking, especially between 1940 and 1942, was that access to the scarce technology had to be apportioned between competing claimants of the three services, and there was never enough ‘bombe time’ to go around.
Throughout 1940, human brainpower remained the dominant element in Bletchley’s successes, which increased with every passing week. It was ‘the Herivel tip’, not bombes, that enabled the team to crack the army-Luftwaffe ‘Red’ key in May. The overwhelming bulk of enemy traffic read through the rest of the year – around a thousand messages a day – was that of the Luftwaffe, and until the end of the war air force material was accessed more swiftly than that of the other services. An important requirement for success was what the codebreakers called ‘depth’ – possession of sufficient messages in a given key to give them playing space for calculations and speculations.
Luftwaffe signals provided many clues to the Wehrmacht’s parallel activities, but in the early days interpretation was impeded by lack of understanding of German terminology and abbreviations. In September 1940, Bletchley broke some traffic from Göring’s pathfinder unit, KGr100, which enabled it to forecast the targets of several bomber raids. But warning was of little practical usefulness to the defenders when hard power, in the form of radar-guided RAF night-fighters, was lacking in both numbers and effectiveness.
As more bombes were built – by 1945 there were 211 of them – they were dispersed around the London suburbs as a precaution against an enemy air attack on Bletchley. The operators, chiefly young women of the WRNS, found long hours beside the hot, smelly, clattering machines extraordinarily gruelling, especially when they were obliged to use tweezers to adjust the delicate electrical wiring. Some girls were unnerved by the monotonous racket. One of them said: ‘It was like a lot of knitting machines working – a kind of tickety-clickety noise.’ They went home with their shirt cuffs blackened by a fine spray of oil from the bombes’ revolving drums.
Naval Enigma remained for many months impenetrable. This was partly because its system of eight rotors, of which three were used at any one time, posed greater difficulties than the army’s five, and partly also because the Kriegsmarine’s operators were more disciplined than their Luftwaffe counterparts, and committed fewer errors to provide openings for Bletchley. There was a brief spasm of success in late April 1940, when five days’ traffic was read, but thereafter more than a year elapsed – an eternity in the minds of those who wrestled vainly with the problem day after day, week upon week – before the big breakthrough. Denniston said gloomily to Frank Birch, a 1918 veteran of Room 40 who now headed the naval section: ‘You know, the Germans don’t mean you to read their stuff, and I don’t suppose you ever will.’ Alan Turing himself had been dallying with the Kriegsmarine’s traffic almost since his arrival at Bletchley. A colleague, Hugh Alexander, observed that he became engaged because nobody else seemed to be making headway, and in his remote fashion he was fascinated by the abstract challenge.
It was Turing who devised a new method christened ‘Banburismus’, employing long punched paper sheets manufactured in the town of Banbury, which assisted the first important breaks into Kriegsmarine messages by reducing the number of possible Enigma rotor orders to be tested from 336 to around eighteen. This system was introduced in the spring of 1941, just as British losses to U-boats began to become alarming. On land, the British in those days lacked power and opportunity to do much with such knowledge of the Wehrmacht’s movements as they secured, and there was a large element of luck about what messages