Steve Magnante's 1001 Corvette Facts. Steve MagnanteЧитать онлайн книгу.
than 1955.”
232 Interestingly, Heedless Horsepower didn’t single out any particular manufacturer. Rather, it used numbers to deliver its sobering, anti-performance message. Statistics comparing 1955 and 1956 included these items: 40,000 deaths, 2,200 more than 1955. In 1956 there were 2.368 million injuries, 210,000 more than 1955. And casualties from speeding totaled 812,750. Pedestrian casualties totaled 233,080, 2,680 more than 1955. Heedless Horsepower also studied when accidents happened and reported that 16,680 deaths occurred on weekends, almost 42 percent of the total. Youth was also at play, with 27.6 percent of the drivers involved in fatal accidents younger than 25 years of age. And in a thinly veiled poke at the vehicles involved in these accidents, the report said, “almost 80 percent of the accidents occurred on dry roads in clear weather,” that “more than 81 percent of the casualties resulted from driver error,” and that “more than 23 percent of the deaths and 28 percent of the injuries occurred between 4 and 8 pm.”
233 Less than a decade later, consumer advocate Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed arrived in 1965. A non-fiction best seller, the book devoted a chapter to attacking the Corvair (Arkus-Duntov’s juggled tire-pressure fix was discussed) and opened the door to government oversight. Although painful, (at times) unfair, and biased, Unsafe at Any Speed did more good than harm. Carmakers eventually broke away from long-held beliefs that discussion of accidents hurt sales, and we can thank these publications and activists for the extremely safe nature of the modern automobile. It was certainly true that striking a tree at faster than 30 mph in any average American car built before January 1, 1968 (when federal laws mandated factory installation of seat belts in all new cars), was likely to result in serious injury. A similar impact today would most likely result in occupants walking away from the incident.
234 Between 1957 and 1962, a total of 7,828 Rochester mechanical-fuel-injection units were installed on Corvettes for retail sale to the general public. The resulting take rates are: 1957, 1,040 out of 6,339 cars; 1958, 1,511 out of 9,168 cars; 1959, 920 out of 9,670 cars; 1960, 859 out of 10,261 cars; 1961, 1,580 out of 10,939 cars; and 1962, 1,918 out of 14,531 cars (see Chapter 3 for 1963–1965 Sting Ray fuel-injection data). Rochester fuel injection was also offered on 1957–1959 full-sized passenger cars, with 1,530 sold in 1957 alone. Exact production records for 1958 and 1959 full-sized vehicle fuel-injection installations haven’t surfaced yet, but it is almost certain that output was lower than in 1957.
235 Remembering that Chevrolet envisioned fuel injection as being just as helpful to economy and drivability as it was to maximum performance, the Rochester unit was made available on the mild, lower-compression, hydraulic-cam-equipped 283 as well as the headline-stealing version with its elevated compression, solid lifters, and Duntov cam. Corvette sales brochures claimed the lower-output fuel-injection engine options “combined the best features of the proven Ramjet Fuel Injection with exceptional smoothness and reliability.” The downside was the fuel-injection unit cost a heady $484.20 regardless of which version of the 283 it was bolted to. This dual-identity strategy was also applied to 1957–1959 full-sized passenger cars where the fuel-injection mill also came in two levels of performance.
236 So how many Corvette fuel-injection buyers went for the milder 250-hp unit instead of the high-revving 290-hp unit? In 1957: 284 mild/756 wild, in 1958: 504 mild/1,007 wild, in 1959: 175 mild/745 wild, and in 1960: 100 mild/759 wild. For 1961, all fuel-injected engines were fitted with improved cylinder heads with bigger intake valves (1.94 instead of 1.72; exhaust valves remained at 1.50 inches) and ports (essentially cast-iron copies of the still-born 1960 aluminum-head option; see Fact 190). The improved 1961 heads bumped base fuel-injection power to 275 hp, while the top-dog fuel-injection engine climbed to 315 hp. Once again, the wild fuelie outsold its little brother, 118 mild/1,462 wild.
237 By 1962, Chevrolet faced the depressing reality that fuel injection was predominantly seen as a high-performance item. Mass-market appreciation and use of its greater benefits was still decades away. To give the buyer what he wanted while simultaneously simplifying inventory and streamlining production hassles, Chevrolet dropped the lukewarm fuelie option and based all 1962 fuel-injection engines on the new 327-ci V-8, with 360 hp and 352 ft-lbs of torque. Chevrolet built 1,918 units, keeping the price steady at $484.20.
238 “Since October 20, 1961, high-performance Corvette engines with option 396 (340 hp) or option 582 (360 hp) have been built with double gaskets on each cylinder head. With the two head gaskets, the compression ratio of these engines is reduced to 10.5:1. Corvette engines with these high-performance options built prior to the production change have single gaskets at each head and a compression ratio of 11.25:1. Corvette engines with 11.25:1 compression ratio require Super Premium fuel (100–102 Research Octane) or problems of detonation, pre-ignition, or die-seling may result.” These words appeared on a Chevrolet Technical Service Bulletin issued on January 2, 1962, and solved the head-scratching mystery encountered when early-build 1962 Corvette fuelie engine disassemblers encountered two head gaskets on each bank. It wasn’t a rumor or myth. Chevrolet also manipulated compression on certain 409 W-engines in this same time period by adding gaskets.
239 In December 1953, many Chevrolet engineers were probably preoccupied with holiday preparations. Not Arkus-Duntov. On December 13, he submitted an essay titled “Thoughts Pertaining to Youth, Hot Rodders, and Chevrolet” to his boss, Maurice Olley. In it, he wrote, “A young man buying a (Hot Rod, Hop Up, etc.) magazine for the first time immediately becomes introduced to Ford. It is reasonable to assume that when hot rodders or hot-rod-influenced persons buy transportation, they buy Fords. As they progress in age and income, they graduate from jalopies to second-hand Fords, then to new Fords.”
240 When Arkus-Duntov wrote his manifesto in the final weeks of 1953, Ford’s modern OHV Y-block V-8 was just entering the market as a 1954 offering. Was Arkus-Duntov aware of the imminent release of Chevrolet’s small-block V-8 when he wrote this document? Yes. In a four-part summary of Ford’s advantages, he wrote, “[The appearance of Ford overhead V-8 [is] now one year ahead of us.” This is a clear indicator that he was in on the 1955 model-year launch of the 265-ci Chevy small-block V-8. Virtually overnight, car magazines caught on to the 265’s inherent power advantage over Ford’s asthmatic Y-block, and the Ford dynasty crumbled soon after. It is ironic that today, many readers of the major hot-rod-type magazines moan that they’re “full of nothing but Chevys.” Before 1955, nobody could have foreseen this twist of fate.
241 Arkus-Duntov’s habit of writing memos directly to upper management occasionally stepped on the toes of his immediate bosses, but he succeeded in changing and focusing corporate thinking on many pivotal occasions. Another memo, dated October 15, 1954, was sent directly to Chevrolet division chief engineer Ed Cole. Bypassing the uncooperative Maurice Olley, it pled for a special team of engineers dedicated to nothing but Corvette advancement. Cole listened, and the note led to Arkus-Duntov’s post as Corvette’s (unofficial, until 1968) program manager, where one of his early assignments was adapting the 265 V-8 to the Corvette for its 1955 rollout.
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