Advancing the Human Self. Ewa NowakЧитать онлайн книгу.
a multiplicity of selves (…) that touch, meet, cross, and blur according to context must all be given voice,” Audre Lorde, The cancer journals, San Francisco, Aunt Lute Books, 1978, p. 37.
76 Joan McCarthy, Dennett and Ricoeur on the narrative self, New York, Humanity Books, 2009, p. 59.
77 J. McCarthy, Dennett and Ricoeur on the narrative self, p. 56.
78 J. McCarthy, Dennett and Ricoeur, p. 66.
79 Sergei V.S. Pakhomov, Glenn E. Smith, Susan Marino, Angela Birnbaum, Neill Graff-Radford, Richard Caselli, Bradley Boeve, David S. Knopman, “A computerized technique to assess language use patterns in patients with frontotemporal dementia,” Journal of Neurolinguistics 2010, vol. 127, p. 129.
80 Damien Lesenfants, Camille Chatelle, Steven Leureys, Quentin Noirhomme, “Brain-Computer Interfaces, Locked-In Syndrome, and disorders of consciousness,” Médicine/Sciences 2015, vol. 31, no. 10, p. 904.
81 D. Lesenfants et al., “Brain-Computer Interfaces,” p. 904.
82 Dina Habbal, Olivia Gosseries, Quentin Noirhomme, Jerome Renaux, Damien Lesenfants, Tristan A. Bekinschtein, Steve Majerus, Steven Laureys, Caroline Schnakers, “Volitional electromyographic responses in disorders of consciousness,” Brain Injury 2014, vol. 28, no. 9, p. 1173.
83 Dina Habbal et al., “Volitional electromyographic,” p. 1173.
84 Stephan Millet, “Self and embodiment: A bio-phenomenological approach to dementia,” Dementia 2011, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 509–522.
85 “So brain transplantation, at least initially, will really be head transplantation–or body transplantation, depending on your perspective,” Robert J. White, “Head transplants,” Scientific American: Your Bionic Future 1999, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 24.
86 Frank E. Johnson, Katherine Virgo (Eds.), The bionic human, Totowa NJ, Humana Press, 2006; for persons reduced to “commander data” see Sidney Perkowitz, From bionic humans to androids, Washington DC, The Joseph Henry Press, 2004, p. 173.
87 Robert Kegan, The evolving self. Problem and process in human development, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 104.
88 Audre Lorde, Sister/Outsider: Essay and speeches, New York, Crossing Press, 1984, p. 88.
89 See Daniel Hutto, Shaun Gallagher, “What’s the story with body narratives? Philosophical therapy for therapeutic practice;” also, “Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice,” in: Jordan Zlatev, Timothy Racine, Chris Sinha, Esa Itkonen (Eds.), The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 2008, pp. 17–38; Jan Assmann, “Einführung” in Schweigen. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation, vol. IX, hg. von Aleida Assmann, Jan Assmann. Munich, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2013, p. 22.
90 Jan Hendrik van den Berg, Metabletica. Über die Wandlung des Menschen. Grundlagen einer historischen Psychologie, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960, pp. 56–57.
91 Rober Kegan, Lisa Laskow Lahey, How the way we talk can change the way we work. Seven languages for transformation, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2001, p. 30.
92 D. Wiese, The powers of the false, p. 24.
93 Meguchi Yama, “Ego consciousness in the Japanese psyche: culture, myth and disaster,” Journal of Analytical Psychology 2013, vol. 58, pp. 57–58.
94 Meguchi Yama, “Ego consciousness,” p. 58.
95 Robert Wilkinson, Nishida and Western philosophy, Farnham, Ashgate, 2009, p. 118.
96 Nishida Kitarō, Intelligibility and the philosophy of nothingness. Three philosophical essays, trans. R. Schinzinger. Westport Conn, Greenwood Press, 1958, p. 197. “The contradictory nature of the self’s mode of being is manifest also in our awareness of our own mortality, our own ‘eternal nothingness: that every living being must die, and that our self faces permanent negation in death,” Wilkinson comments, Nishida and…, p. 118.
97 M. Yama, “Ego consciousness,” p. 53.
98 M. Yama, “Ego consciousness,” p. 53.
99 M. Yama, “Ego consciousness,” p. 53.
100 M. Yama, “Ego consciousness,” p. 57.
101 Obviously, Bakhtin’s “dialogic imagination,” “internal dialogism” and dialogised self may inspire the theorists of narrative self today, see Michael Holquist, The dialogic imagination by M. Bakhtin, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 173.
102 According to Aleksander Fiut, Miłosz was “against polyphony and for a variety of voices,” Chapter “The identity game,” idem, The eternal moment. The Poetry of Czesław Miłosz. Trans. T. S. Robertson, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, University of California Press, 1990, p. 208, note 10. The “variety of voices” permanently rattling and reverberating through our daily ‘self’ can be illustrated with some lines from Miłosz:
“I am walking about. No longer human.
Visiting our thick forests and houses and manors.
(…) I am abstracted
with disturbing questions from the end of my century,
mainly regarding the truth, where does it come from …?”
(Czesław Miłosz, “The Hooks of a Corset”)
103 See Galen Strawson, “Episodic ethics,” in: Daniel D. Hutto (Ed.), Narrative and understanding persons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
104 D. de Rougemont, The myths of love, p. 194.