The Turkish Arms Embargo. James F. GoodeЧитать онлайн книгу.
that 90 percent of Turkish Cypriots released as prisoners of war or detainees chose to head north, even though their families were often in the southern part of the island. Turkish Cypriots were gathering in the area controlled by the Turkish army, quickly “Turkifying” the northern sector.19
Even responsible spokesmen sometimes wandered into this murky landscape. Such was the case when notoriously outspoken Congressman Ed Koch (D-NY) recalled Ottoman barbarities toward the Armenians and suggested that “Turkish events in Cyprus today may yet warrant similar distinction.” More surprising were statements by Congressman Brademas printed in the English-language Turkish Daily News. “The government of Turkey has in my opinion acted in a very uncivilized way,” he observed. He followed this with a reference to Hitler’s attempt to outgun everyone, noting, “might is right.” The usually cautious congressman might not have understood how much the Turks resented such unfavorable comparisons, which had a long history.20
Throughout the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and into the early years of the Turkish republic, foreigners repeatedly made claims about the Turks’ barbarity, their animal-like natures, and their lack of any civilizing qualities. These outrageous allegations seemed endless. It was in part to end such derogatory assertions by supercilious Europeans and Americans that Ataturk launched his movement to transform the Turkish nation, to make all Turks proud of their heritage and ethnicity. Symbolic of this goal was the founder’s widely publicized statement, “Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk.” This was not mere chauvinism; it was an attempt to encourage a new and necessary confidence among his fellow citizens. In this, he appeared to have remarkable success. Ataturk also positioned Turkey closer to Europe, distancing it from the Middle East.21 Now, in the mid-1970s, many of the former stereotypes were resurfacing among foreign observers.
The Greeks and many of their Greek American supporters argued that the Turkish Cypriot minority had been treated well in Cyprus and got on well with their Greek Cypriot neighbors. They claimed that a minority of extremists, acting in accord with the Turks in Ankara, was forcing the Turkish Cypriots to live in isolated enclaves throughout the island. Father Evagoras Constantinides, a Cypriot by birth and a member of a delegation meeting with Secretary Kissinger and his deputy Robert Ingersoll on August 26, 1974, asserted that “he was not aware of any oppression of the Turks by the Greeks in Cyprus” and claimed that “insurrectionist Turks always held at least one member of a family hostage to ensure the return of the others.” These seem, at best, only partial explanations for the continuing tension and violence between the two communities throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.22
Of the Greek American organizations actively pursuing justice for Cyprus, none surpassed AHEPA. Founded in 1922, it had thousands of members in all fifty states and possessed an effective structure for activating the larger community. On July 22, just two days after the initial Turkish invasion, AHEPA announced a July 24 press conference in Washington, where leaders of twenty Greek American societies would demand the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus. AHEPA would continue to be one of the leading critics of Turkish actions on the island and of the Ford administration’s policies toward the crisis as well.23
Although AHEPA was the oldest and best known of the Greek American associations, there were others that took on important roles. The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) limited its membership of approximately 200 individuals to professionals and academics. Headquartered in Washington, DC, it was led by Eugene Rossides, who had served in the Treasury Department under Nixon and was a law partner of William Rogers, former secretary of state and attorney general. Rossides knew how to get things done in the capital. He became a leading spokesman on Cyprus and was often called to testify before congressional committees on behalf of Greek Americans. His model for AHI was the highly successful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). According to political scientist Paul Watanabe, who has studied the organization closely, “whenever any key votes were in the offing, AHI-PAC reviewed its congressional profiles in order to determine the most effective strategies to persuade individual congressmen. Armed with this information, AHI-PAC dispatched at least two influential Greek American constituents, who were carefully preselected, to contact, in person if possible, each congressman.”24
The third of the “big three” organizations—those whose representatives were regularly invited to testify at congressional hearings—was the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC) in Chicago, a center of Greek American activism. Andrew Athens, president of Metro Steel Corporation and a close ally of Senator Charles Percy (R-IL), headed this organization. It was said to be the creation of Archbishop Iakovos, and it maintained close ties to the Greek Orthodox Church. UHAC organized large public protests to support the arms embargo and aid for Cypriot refugees.25
Archbishop Iakovos, primate of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, exercised an equally powerful voice. He was born Demetrios Koukouzis on the Aegean island of Imbros in the Ottoman Empire in 1911 and came to the United States when he was twenty-eight years old. He was ordained a priest in 1940 and became archbishop in 1959; he would serve in that post until his resignation in 1996. A strong supporter of the civil rights movement, Iakovos joined hands with Martin Luther King Jr. at the Selma march in March 1965. He appears next to King in the iconic photo at the Edmund Pettus Bridge.
On Friday, July 26, the archbishop telephoned Congressman John Brademas, one of only five Greek Americans in the House of Representatives. Brademas, a Rhodes scholar, had become the first Greek American member of Congress when he was elected to the House in 1958, and he was now the spokesman for this small group of representatives. The archbishop expressed his concern about the buildup of Turkish forces on the island. Iakovos seemed to be out ahead of the Indiana congressman, who knew few details and initially argued that Turkey’s actions were justified, given the coup against Makarios. Iakovos told Brademas that the Greek Orthodox Church could not look the other way when humanitarian issues were involved. From the outset, he also believed that the United States had encouraged the Turks to invade Cyprus. Brademas promised to contact the archbishop again on Monday, after his meeting with the other Greek American congressmen and a possible briefing at the State Department.26 That same day (July 26), Brademas and his Greek American colleagues—Skip Bafalis (R-FL), Peter Kyros (D-ME), Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), and Gus Yatron (D-PA)—sent a congratulatory note to Prime Minister Karamanlis, praising Greece’s return to free and democratic political institutions.27
In recent years, the Greek American community had split over how to relate to the military regime in Athens. Those who opposed the junta and wanted to cut US arms to Greece organized groups such as the US Committee for Democracy in Greece to lobby the US government. Others tolerated the junta and seemed content to carry on business as usual, just as the Nixon administration had done. With the junta’s disappearance, they could all unite in their criticism of Turkey’s actions in Cyprus.28
As arranged, Brademas spoke again with Iakovos and shared what he had learned at the State Department about the situation on Cyprus. He assured the archbishop that he and the other Greek American congressmen would work together on behalf of Cyprus. He suggested that Iakovos and other Greek American leaders write to officials in Washington to protest the continuing Turkish buildup on the island.29
Iakovos was one step ahead of the Indiana congressman, having called an important meeting for Tuesday, July 30, in New York City, where he resided. He convened the Archdiocesan Council and the presidents of many Greek American federations and societies at the St. Moritz Hotel in Manhattan. The gathering’s purpose was to organize and take immediate action to bring relief to the people of Cyprus. The archbishop was clearly in charge. After much discussion, it was unanimously decided that he would appoint members to a committee to coordinate assistance. He would also select a representative in each state to organize a local committee to expedite the national program’s work. The attendees decided to ask Congress to cut off all aid to Turkey if that nation had not complied with the UN cease-fire resolution within thirty days.30
Kissinger struggled amid the rising chorus of ethnic protest. On August 21, 20,000 Greek Americans marched in Chicago’s Grant Park. AHEPA sent circulars to all its chapters instructing them to send telegrams asking their congressmen to cosponsor House Resolution 1319, calling for an aid cutoff. On