Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne). Aristotle Читать онлайн книгу.
the subject, which, being a moral one, will not admit of mathematical exactness, fail of making morals a definite and exact science. There must, and will always be, room left for the moral sense and practical wisdom of each individual, to exercise in each case of moral action its judicial functions. If, in this case, or in any other, you deal with men in this way, you are dealing with them as children; and, therefore, according to Aristotle’s views, as being incapable of perfect moral action.
The discussion of these virtues or mean states, both moral and intellectual, forms, it will be found, a very important portion of this treatise. We shall find, amongst them, many virtues which belong to man in his political rather than in his individual character:—magnificence, that virtue of the rich, which to an Athenian mind appeared nearly akin to patriotism:—the social qualities, which we should scarcely in these days formally elevate into the rank of virtues, but which, nevertheless, practically, we value almost as highly, and which contribute so much to the happiness of every-day life:—justice, not only that universal justice which implies the doing to every one according to the laws of God and man, and therefore is synonymous with virtue, but also that particular virtue which is more especially exercised by one who is entrusted by the constitution of his country with administrative or executive authority:—and, lastly, friendship, that law of sympathy, and concord, and love between the good and virtuous, clearly and inseparably connected with—nay, based upon, originating in, and springing out of—a reasonable self-love, which is not, indeed, strictly speaking, a virtue, but indispensable to virtue and human happiness.
Friendship is a subject on which the mind of Greece especially loved to dwell. It pervades many of her historical and poetical traditions; it is interwoven with many of her best institutions, her holiest recollections. In one of its forms, that of hospitality, it was the bond which united Greeks in one vast family, as it were, even in times of bitter hostility. No Greek, therefore, could have considered that a moral philosopher had fully accomplished his task, and finished his work, if the discussion of this subject had not formed part of his treatise. And when we find that Aristotle places friendship so high, as to say that its existence would supersede and render unnecessary even justice, and that the true friend loves his friend for that friend’s sake, and for that motive alone, it seems to approach in some degree to the Christian ride of charity, which teaches us to love our neighbor as ourselves,—to that love which, based on principle, and not merely on instinct, is on divine authority said to be “the fulfilling of the law.”
In the practical consideration of each individual virtue, Aristotle necessarily treats of moral and intellectual virtue separately from each other; but we must not suppose, for that reason, that he thought they could exist separately. According to his view, moral virtue implies the due regulation of our moral nature, with all its appetites, instincts, and passions; and this state only exists when they are subordinate to the dominion and control of the reasoning faculties. Again, the reason does not act with all the vigor of which it is naturally capable, unless our moral nature is in a well-regulated state. Hence the different parts of human nature reciprocally act and react upon each other, every good resolution carried into effect, every act of self-control and moral discipline, increases the vigor of the pure, reason, and renders the highest faculty of our nature more and more able to perform its work. Again, the more powerful the reason becomes, the fewer external obstacles, such as vice presents to its energies, the intellect meets with, the more effectually does it influence the moral nature, and strengthen, confirm, and render permanent the moral habits. Thus continence is gradually improved into temperance; and if human nature were capable of attaining perfection, man would attain to that ideal standard which Aristotle terms heroic virtue.
But this is above human nature, and is impossible to attain, just as its opposite, brutality, is never found, so long as human nature continues in its normal condition, but only in cases where bodily mutilation, or moral perversion, or the influence of barbarism, has so far degraded the human being, that he may be considered as having entirely ceased to be a man.
There is another important subject connected with morals of which it was absolutely necessary for Aristotle to treat fully. Pleasure, as a motive to action, had been so interwoven with other philosophical systems, that the disciple of the Aristotelian ethical philosophy could not be content without the place which it ought to occupy being accurately defined. Pleasure, then, had been held by Plato and others to be a motion or a generation, and therefore of a transitory or transient nature: this Aristotle denies, and affirms it to be a whole, indivisible, complete, perfect, giving a perfection, a finish, as it were, to an energy; being, as he says in order to illustrate its nature, what the bloom is to youth. But if so, pleasure must be active, energetic; it cannot be simply rest: and yet the testimony of mankind, if we observe what they propose to themselves as pleasure, would be in favor of the notion of its being rest, in some sense or other. How, then, were these apparent inconsistencies to be reconciled? In the following manner. It is rest as regards the body, but energy as regards the mind. It is an activity of the soul—not a mere animal activity. This distinction enables us to mark the difference between true and false pleasures. Those which are consequent upon the mere activity of our corporeal nature are low and unreal; those which attend upon the energies of our intellectual nature are true and perfect, and worthy of the dignity of man.
But as happiness is an energy or activity of the soul according to its highest excellence, and that this must be that which is the characteristic property of man, namely, pure intellectual excellence, it is evident that contemplative happiness is superior to every other kind, and constitutes the chief good of man. Although happiness must be sought for and arrived at by the formation of habits of practical virtue, still all other virtues must be pursued with a view to the final gratification of our intellectual nature; the end of the cultivation of all virtue is to fit us for the pure and unmixed enjoyment of contemplation. Contemplative enjoyment is the most perfect, most permanent, and most independent of external helps and appliances.
If, then, after all that has been said respecting moral practical virtue, contemplation is the end and object of man, his chief good, his highest happiness, why has Aristotle said so much of the practical nature of human happiness? why has he attributed so much importance to the formation of the moral character? why has he left the subject of contemplative happiness to be briefly discussed at the very conclusion of his treatise?
The answer to these questions is plain. Until the moral character is formed, man is unfit, not only for the enjoyment, but also for forming a correct conception and appreciation of the happiness which is derived from contemplation. Place before his eyes in the commencement of his search after happiness intellectual contemplation, as the end at which he is aiming, and he would neither be able to understand its nature, nor estimate its value. It is by the gradual perfection of our moral nature, and by this method only, that we are brought into that state in which the intellectual principle is able to act purely and uninterruptedly. The improvement of our moral and intellectual faculties will go on parallel to one another. Every evil habit conquered, every good habit formed, will remove an obstacle to the energy of the intellect, and assist in invigorating its nature. Begin with contemplation, and we shall neither find subjects for it, of a nature sufficiently exalted to insure real happiness, nor be in a condition to derive happiness from such subjects, if suggested to us. Begin with moral training, and we shall attain higher capacities for intellectual happiness, whether derived from the contemplation of abstract truth, or of the perfection and attributes of the Deity.{1} The Christian philosopher will easily understand the value of this method of teaching; for he knows that it is revealed to us, that in divine things moral training is the way to intellectual cultivation, that the heart is the way to the understanding—“If any man will do God’s will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.” (St. John vii. 17.) It is plain that, in this respect, the way which the heathen moralist has pointed out to the attainment of happiness is that which is most in accordance with the principles of human nature, and therefore with the laws of Him who is both the author of revelation, and of the moral constitution of man.
It only remains now to point out how Aristotle connects the subject of ethics with that of which he considers it a subordinate division; namely, politics. The idea of a state implies a human society united together upon just, moral, and reasonable principles. These principles are developed and displayed